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INTRODUCTION
The patent system encourages innovators to invest in research and de-
velopment (R&D) by granting an inventor a significant period of exclusivity
during which no one else can make or sell a product (or use a process) that in-
fringes the inventor's patent. Without this period of exclusivity, innovators
may worry that their inventions could be copied and sold by competitors
who have not invested the time and money to create the product or process.
Because firms that merely copy-and do not innovate-do not have to recoup
their investment in R&D, they could charge a lower price than the innovator. If
copying were allowed, innovators would be less likely to invest in new projects
because they would be unlikely to recoup their investment.
The patent system works only if the innovators-and not the copiers-are
granted the award of exclusivity. In some cases, however, copiers may be
thieves. Instead of waiting for the innovator to patent its product and then
copy the patented innovation, some firms (or individuals) may copy the in-
novator's product and then race to the Patent Office in order to claim the
invention as their own. This is patent theft.' If successful, the patent thief can
exclude even the true innovator from making and selling the product that she
herself invented.
Allegations of patent theft abound. Much litigation involves allegations of
one firm stealing another firm's innovation and including it in a patent applica-
2tion. Disputed cases of firms stealing ideas from their actual inventors and then
patenting them involve, among other inventions, cattle temperature-monitoring
1. In patent parlance, some would refer to this as "derivation." The Federal Circuit has explained:
A claim that a patentee derived an invention addresses originality-who invented the subject
matter of the count? Under this attack on a patent or patent application, the proponent asserts
that the patentee did not "invent" the subject matter of the count because the patentee derived
the invention from another. To prove derivation ... the person attacking the patent must
establish prior conception of the claimed subject matter and communication of the conception
to the adverse claimant.
Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). The America Invents Act
created "new 'derivation proceedings' that prevent a person from obtaining a patent by copying an
invention from an inventor and filing a patent application before that inventor files a patent applica-
tion." William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REv. 341, 368 n.188 (2013). Because the
nuances of derivation doctrine do not affect the antitrust principles at issue, this Article will use the
term "patent theft."
2. See, e.g., Pension Advisory Grp., Ltd. v. Country Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 680 (S.D. Tex.
2011).
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devices,3 stethoscope-cover dispensers,4 light-up construction toys,5 water-
powered push brooms, 6 devices for capping oil spills,7 artificial arteries,' and
treatments for ocular disease.9 Innovators have claimed that their ideas have
been stolen by employers,'o by people violating written nondisclosure and
confidentiality agreements," and by peer reviewers for prestigious scientific
journals.12 In some of these cases, the allegations of patent theft have been
proven in a court of law.'3
When the patent thief succeeds in stealing and patenting another's innova-
tion and then using the exclusionary rights granted by the patent to monopolize
a market, antitrust principles are implicated. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
condemns illegal monopolization, which refers to monopolization through anti-
competitive conduct instead of through competition on the merits. Patent fraud-
securing a patent by lying to the Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office or
PTO)-represents anticompetitive conduct. Patent fraud generally occurs when
the patent applicant misrepresents the date of its first public sale or public use of
the idea for which the patent is sought or otherwise omits references to prior art
that would lead the patent examiner to reject the application.
Patent theft is a species of patent fraud in that the patent applicant is lying to
the Patent Office in order to secure a patent that it is not entitled to receive.
However, although monopolization through patent fraud violates Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, monopolization through patent theft does not. This is peculiar
because monopolization through patent theft is essentially monopolization
3. Randy Ellis, Cattlemen Argue over Thermometer Rights: While Trying to Secure a Research
Grant, a Man Says His Idea Was Stolen, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 15, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
810000.
4. James Ritchie, Cincinnati Entrepreneur Sues, Claims Her Invention Stolen, CINCINNATI Bus.
COURIER, July 8, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 13568919.
5. Joan Verdon, Laser Pegs, Lite Brix Court Fight on Hold, RECORD, Mar. 13, 2013, available at
2013 WLNR 6237610.
6. Mike Mathis, Lumberton Man Claims Company Stole Invention, BURLINGTON COUNTY TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 17307991.
7. Laurence Hammack, Radford Man Says Oil Firm Stole His Design for Spill Cap, ROANOKE TIMES,
June 21, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 12937727.
8. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see
also Marsha Austin, Surgeon Sues Gore-Tex Makers Alleges Idea Stolen, Seeks Profits Since '72,
DENVER PosT, Aug. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 534294.
9. Doctor Sues Marek for $3.75 Billion, SINOCAST, Feb. 19, 1997.
10. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Martin, 74 F.2d 951, 953
(C.C.P.A. 1935).
11. See Hammack, supra note 7.
12. See Kathleen Day, Patents and Peer Pressures; Two Firms' Legal Fight May Shake a Mainstay
ofScientific Research, WASH. PosT, Apr. 19, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 6569918.
13. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Univ.
of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Colo. 2001). The America
Invents Act has shifted the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent standard to a first-to-file standard.
Under either system, a patentee should not be entitled to patent an invention that it stole (or "derived")
from the true inventor. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 367-68 & n.188. It is too early, however, to
determine whether and how this change will affect the frequency of patent theft.
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through patent fraud (which is clearly illegal) coupled with stealing (which is
independently illegal). In other words, coupling an antitrust violation with
another illegal act creates antitrust immunity.
This Article explores how courts have created antitrust immunity for patent
theft and why this rule is mistaken. Part I introduces basic antitrust concepts,
including the antitrust cause of action for illegal monopolization. It shows how
courts have applied these antitrust principles to patent fraud, for example, when
a firm acquires monopoly power by enforcing a patent that it procured by
committing fraud on the Patent Office.
Part II of this Article explores the argument-advanced by influential jurists-
that a firm that monopolizes a market through patent theft does not violate the
antitrust laws. In Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., Judge Richard Posner
reasoned that so long as a particular patent should issue to someone, who gets
the patent and how that individual acquires it are of no antitrust consequence.14
The Brunswick rule is based on the assumption that patent theft does not create
monopoly power; it merely transfers it from one firm to another. Judge Posner
further argued that patent theft cannot affect the price paid by consumers
because whoever controls the patent will charge the same profit-maximizing
price. Thus, patent theft does not affect consumer welfare and is not a concern
of antitrust law. Posner's opinion has become the conventional wisdom. After
Brunswick, monopolization through patent theft does not violate Section 2's
prohibition against illegal monopolization.
Part III explains why the rationales for immunizing patent theft from antitrust
liability are unsound. Under some conditions, patent theft can create market
power, not merely transfer it. For example, in a scenario involving substitute
patents, if two patentable technologies could compete against each other and the
owner of one of these technologies steals the other and patents both of them, the
patent thief could acquire monopoly power that would not exist if the two
patentable technologies were owned by competing firms. Independent of sub-
stitute patents, which firm acquires a particular patent has competitive impli-
cations because not all patent owners would exercise the exclusionary rights
in the same way. Some patent owners may pledge their patents to the public
domain. Others may enforce their patents less aggressively or more selectively.
Additionally, not all patentholders price their patented inventions similarly.
Part III describes how various regulatory, institutional, contractual, and market
constraints can limit some patentees'-but not others'-ability to charge a
monopoly price.
Patent theft also implicates innovation and efficiency concerns. Price competi-
tion is only one facet of how competition affects consumer welfare. Dynamic
competition is what spurs innovation, ensuring that consumers benefit from
products being improved and entire new categories of consumer products being
developed. Dynamic competition depends on proper incentives being in place.
14. 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Patent theft reduces the expected benefits of R&D. If one's ideas can be
misappropriated by a rival firm who can use a stolen patent to exclude the
innovator from the market, the incentive to innovate is significantly reduced.
Furthermore, as an innovator in the past, the true inventor may be more likely to
take the monopoly profits associated with a valuable patent and reinvest them to
develop future innovations. Finally, patent theft can impose inefficiency on the
economy by encouraging patent suppression and discouraging the efficient
licensing of technology. For all of these reasons, patent theft can reduce
consumer welfare in a manner that antitrust law cares about.
Part IV explains why monopolization through patent theft violates Section 2
of the Sherman Act. Assuming that the patent thief has monopoly power,
stealing a rival's patent constitutes monopoly conduct. Patent theft is not
competition on the merits, nor does it fall within any recognized antitrust
defense. Both the excluded rivals (including the true inventor) and consumers
who pay inflated prices suffer antitrust injury and are appropriate antitrust
plaintiffs. Moreover, antitrust liability is appropriate for patent thieves who
illegally monopolize a market because neither patent law nor various state
causes of action provide a sufficient remedy to disgorge the ill-gotten gains of
patent theft, to deter patent theft, or to compensate the victims of patent theft for
their losses. Consequently, antitrust law should condemn monopolization through
patent theft regardless of the fact that the true inventor could have patented the
underlying invention. Patent theft should not be immune from antitrust scrutiny.
I. MONOPOLIZATION THROUGH PATENT FRAUD
The Sherman Act provides the foundation for federal antitrust law. Section 2
of the Sherman Act condemns monopolization and attempted monopolization.15
Congress declined to define any of the Act's terms; the senators and representa-
tives left it to federal judges to interpret language that the statute's authors could
not themselves construe.16 As a result, American antitrust law is essentially
common law, as federal courts define what conduct violates Section 2 on a
case-by-case basis.17
For almost half of a century, this common law process has taken place within
the context of the Grinnell test. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). It also condemns conspiracies to monopolize. Id.
16. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979) ("In passing the
Sherman Act, Congress recognized that it could not enumerate all the activities that would constitute
monopolization. Section 2, therefore, in effect conferred upon the federal courts 'a new jurisdiction to
apply a "common law" against monopolizing."' (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANrrrRUST LAw 40 (1978))).
17. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) ("From the
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.").
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growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident."' 8 The first Grinnell element requires the plaintiff
to define the relevant market-which entails defining the relevant product
market and the relevant geographic market-and then to prove that the defen-
dant has monopoly power in that market.' 9 Monopoly power is the ability to
control prices and exclude competition in the defined relevant market.20 In
general, this requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant enjoys a dominant
market share and that barriers to entry effectively keep competitors out of the
market.2 1 The first element is critical, as many an antitrust defendant has
prevailed at the summary judgment stage by convincing the court that the.
plaintiff has improperly defined the relevant market or that the defendant has no
monopoly power in a properly defined market.
Although Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns monopolization, the mere
act of acquiring or maintaining a monopoly is not illegal. The second element of
the Grinnell test requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant engaged in
monopoly conduct, which courts call predatory conduct, exclusionary conduct,
anticompetitive conduct or, simply, monopoly conduct.22 Despite the unques-
tioned requirement that Section 2 plaintiffs must prove that the monopolist
engaged in predatory conduct, antitrust jurisprudence has failed to clearly define
monopoly conduct or any of its synonyms. The Supreme Court has issued
few generalities or touchstones as to what constitutes exclusionary conduct
beyond opining that "'exclusionary' comprehends at the most behavior that not
only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not
further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive
way." 23 Lower courts have subsequently defined exclusionary conduct as "the
creation or maintenance of monopoly by means other than the competition on
the merits embodied in the Grinnell standard" 24 where that conduct "reasonably
appear[s] capable of making a significant contribution to creating or maintain-
ing monopoly power."25
Some courts define monopoly conduct in relation to the contours and boundar-
ies of competition on the merits. This, in turn, often requires courts to examine
the defendant's reasons for engaging in the conduct that had the effect of
excluding its competitors. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "The key factor
courts have analyzed in order to determine whether challenged conduct is or is
18. 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
19. See id. at 570-79.
20. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
21. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
22. Courts use these terms interchangeably to discuss the second element of the Grinnell test.
23. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985) (quoting
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 16, at 78).
24. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 E3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1999).
25. Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original)
(quoting 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw [ 651, at 82 (1996)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
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not competition on the merits is the proffered business justification for the
act."2 6 The absence of a legitimate business reason for the exclusionary conduct
is evidence of illegal monopolization.27
Absent bright-line rules and clear definitions of the operative language, the
meanings of monopoly conduct and its polar opposite competition on the merits
are defined on a case-by-case basis. When opinions hold that a particular fact
pattern constitutes monopoly conduct, subsequent courts analogize or distin-
guish these earlier fact patterns. Through this common law approach, antitrust
courts decide what conduct by a monopolist constitutes monopoly conduct
sufficient to satisfy the second element of Grinnell.28
This process has, not surprisingly, generated much conflict and consternation
as the various circuits have split on whether particular conduct by a monopolist
creates antitrust liability. For example, although some courts have advocated
deferring to monopolists' decisions to redesign their products to the detriment of
competitors,2 9 other decisions have suggested product redesigns can constitute
predatory conduct.3 0
Through all of these circuit splits and scholarly debates, one species of
anticompetitive conduct, however, has managed to stay above the fray-patent
fraud. Although monopolization through patent acquisition is generally permis-
sible, this assumes that the patent is valid and lawfully acquired.3 1 Unfortu-
nately, some firms acquire monopoly power by procuring patents through
fraud.3 2 For example, a patent applicant may intentionally conceal relevant
information-such as a sale that occurred more than a year before the patent
application was filed or an academic article rendering the claimed invention
obvious-that would lead the patent examiner to reject the patent application.33
Patent fraud can provide the basis for an illegal monopolization claim. In
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., the
26. Stearns, 170 E3d at 522; see also Taylor Publ'g, 216 F.3d at 475 (quoting Stearns, 170 F.3d
at 522).
27. See Stearns, 170 F.3d at 522 ("If the conduct has no rational business purpose other than its
adverse effects on competitors, an inference that it is exclusionary is supported." (citing Aspen Skiing
Co., 472 U.S. at 604-05)).
28. Section 2 of the Sherman Act also condemns attempted monopolization. In Spectrum Sports, Inc.
v. McQuillan, the Supreme Court held that "to demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must
prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power." 506 U.S. 447, 456
(1993). Anticompetitive conduct that satisfies the second element of Grinnell also satisfies the first
element of Spectrum Sports, and vice versa. See, e.g., Taylor Publ'g, 216 E3d at 475, 481 (employing
the Aspen Skiing test in an attempted monopolization case).
29. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979).
30. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
31. See Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (D. Colo. 1997) ("Therefore,
ownership of a valid patent precludes antitrust liability for monopolization of a product or process
within the scope of the patent." (citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964))).
32. See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
33. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to Deceive the Patent
Office, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 323, 324 (2011).
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Supreme Court held that when a monopolist procures a patent through fraud on
the PTO, competitors excluded by the resulting patent can bring suit under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 4 Specifically, the Court held that "the enforce-
ment of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2
of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are
present."35 The holding explicitly provides that patent fraud alone does not
violate antitrust law; the fraud must cause the patentee to acquire or maintain
monopoly power. Just as not every patent confers monopoly power, not every
fraudulently acquired patent bestows monopoly power upon the wrongdoer.
Further, Walker Process requires not merely that the defendant acquired the
patent through fraud, but that it also enforced the fraudulently procured patent
against potential competitors.37
The Supreme Court did not precisely define what conduct constitutes patent
fraud. In adjudicating antitrust cases based on patent fraud, the Federal Circuit
imported the elements of common law fraud into Walker Process jurisprudence.
Consequently, the elements of patent fraud are: "(1) that a false representation
of a material fact was made, (2) with the intent to deceive, (3) which induced
the deceived party to act in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and
(4) which caused injury that would not otherwise have occurred."38 Despite its
articulation of a multi-element test, the Federal Circuit focuses on only two
elements when evaluating claims of patent fraud-materiality and intent. Materi-
ality means that but for the misrepresentation or omission, the patent would not
have issued.3 9 The intent element of Walker Process requires that the misrepre-
sentation or omission be made with the intent to deceive the Patent Office.40
34. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
35. Id. at 174.
36. See infra section IV.A. It is hard, however, to conceive why an applicant would commit patent
fraud unless it believed the patent would generate monopoly power (though it might in the end be
proven wrong).
37. See, e.g., K-Lath v. Davis Wire Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("The Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court clearly require the enforcement or assertion of the patent as an element
necessary to establish antitrust liability."); Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 334 F.
Supp. 1329, 1331 (D. Del. 1971) ("The Supreme Court's opinion made it clear, however, that the sine
qua non of a Section 2 Sherman Act violation depends upon the prerequisites of a fraudulent
procurement and enforcement of a patent."). See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REv. 101 (2006).
38. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit has
also articulated a five-element test for patent fraud, which essentially just breaks the first element of the
four-element test into two separate elements, defining patent fraud as:
(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that representation, (3) the intent to
deceive or, at least, a state of mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be the
equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation by the party
deceived which induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury to the party deceived as a result of
his reliance on the misrepresentation.
In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
39. See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text (discussing materiality).
40. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 330.
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Antitrust law appropriately condemns monopolization through patent fraud
because patent fraud is not competition on the merits. Patent law and antitrust
law exist in a delicate balance. In an effort to increase output and reduce price,
antitrust law condemns exclusionary conduct. Patent law, in contrast, grants
exclusionary rights, which generally have the effect of reducing output and
increasing price. Patent law's suppression of competition is seen as necessary to
encourage investment in innovation. Patent fraud upsets this balance by stifling
competition in a manner that neither rewards nor facilitates innovation.4 1
II. ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR PATENT THEFT
Patent theft would seem to fall within the ambit of Walker Process. Assuming
that the patentee has monopoly power-as is necessary to satisfy the first ele-
ment of Grinnell42 -monopolization through patent theft seems like quintes-
sential anticompetitive conduct. If the patent thief acquires monopoly power by
using a stolen patent to exclude rivals, then it is engaging in exclusionary
conduct. The conduct is not competition on the merits because the monopolist
did not earn a lawful right to exclude; it stole someone else's right.4 3
In contrast to garden-variety patent fraud, however, the conventional wisdom
holds that patent theft cannot provide the basis for Section 2 liability. Judge
Richard Posner created the antitrust rules for patent theft in Brunswick Corp. v.
Riegel Textile Corp.4 In that case, Brunswick alleged that it had invented a new
process for making antistatic yarn 4 5 and that it licensed its invention to Riegel
as a trade secret. Reigel, according to Brunswick, promised to keep Brunswick's
invention secret. Four months after Brunswick applied for a patent, however,
Riegel, too, applied for a patent on the same process of making antistatic yam.
Two years later, unaware of Brunswick's patent application, the Patent Office
issued Riegel a process patent. The Patent Office did not discover Brunswick's
application for the same invention until a year later. The Patent Office then
instituted a patent interference proceeding to determine whether Brunswick or
Riegel was the rightful inventor.4 6 The Patent Office did not issue findings until
41. See Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 138 (2008) ("For those
fraudulently procured patents that confer monopoly power, competition is injured without any counter-
vailing social benefit."); Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545,
556 (1997) ("Invalid patents lack any semblance of constitutional, statutory or policy justification.
Contrary to the basic policy of the patent law they obviously impede technical innovation and
competition, as well as increase prices.").
42. See infra section IV.A.1 (discussing the first element of Grinnell in the context of patent theft).
43. See infra section IV.A.2 (explaining why patent theft by a monopolist satisfies Grinnell's second
element).
44. 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984).
45. In environments where volatile gases are present that could be ignited by static electricity, such
as hospital operating rooms, garments made with antistatic yarn can reduce the risk of explosion. Id.
at 264.
46. Id. Although the America Invents Act has eliminated interference proceedings, it has created
somewhat similar "derivation" proceedings to determine whether the first-filing patent applicant
derived the invention from someone else.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
more than a decade after Brunswick had filed its patent application; the Patent
Office's determination was still under appeal at the time of the Seventh Circuit's
Brunswick opinion.4 7
When the patent system failed to provide a timely resolution, Brunswick
sought relief in federal court. Brunswick filed an antitrust claim against Riegel
for illegally monopolizing the production of antistatic yarn. The district court
dismissed Brunswick's antitrust claims as both barred by the statute of limita-
tions and for failing to state an antitrust cause of action.4 8 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed on both grounds, but not before creating additional requirements for a
Walker Process cause of action. Writing for the majority,49 Judge Posner held:
[F]or a patent fraud ... [to] violate section 2, three conditions must be
satisfied besides proof that the defendant obtained a patent by fraud:
1. The patent must dominate a real market....
2. The invention sought to be patented must not be patentable....
3. The patent must have some colorable validity, conferred for example by
the patentee's efforts to enforce it by bringing patent-infringement suits. 50
Judge Posner's opinion added two new elements to a Walker Process claim:
nonpatentability and colorable validity of the patent at issue.5 ' The core of the
Brunswick test lies in its second element: nonpatentability. Brunswick drew a
critical "distinction between a fraud that leads the Patent Office to issue a patent
on an unpatentable invention . .. and one that merely operates to take the patent
opportunity away from the real inventor." 52 Judge Posner cited no direct
authority for the proposition that Walker Process liability can exist only when
the underlying invention is not patentable by anyone.5 He created a new legal
rule in which the nonpatentability element effectively immunizes patent theft
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Judge Harlington Wood, Jr. concurred in Judge Posner's opinion to affirm the District Court's
dismissal based on the statute of limitations, but he declined to sign on to Judge Posner's discussion
about patent fraud. Id. at 272 ("[A]lthough enlightening, I see no need for much of the antitrust-economic-
patent discussion in Judge Posner's opinion.").
50. Id. at 265 (citations omitted).
51. Brunswick's first element-that "[tihe patent must dominate a real market"-is a reconceptualiza-
tion of the monopoly power element of the Grinnell test. Id; see infra section IV.A. Brunswick's
third element of "colorable validity" is based on Judge Posner's assumption that invalid patents cannot
injure competition. He asserted that "a patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage
competitors from making the patented product or using the patented process, and so will not confer
monopoly power." 752 F.2d at 265. Judge Posner provides no support for his assertion. Yet there is
much reason to conclude it is incorrect. Even when a competitor is convinced that a patent is invalid,
the costs, uncertainty, and pro-patentholder evidentiary rules and presumptions in patent litigation will
cause many prudent firms to refrain from infringing the patent. See Leslie, supra note 37, at 132-37.
52. Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265.
53. Indeed, James Kobak has suggested that "[a] broad interpretation of BrunswicklRiegel is also
arguably inconsistent with that circuit's earlier opinion in Kearney & Trecker, 452 F.2d 579, a precedent
not cited by Judge Posner." James B. Kobak, Jr., Professional Real Estate Investors and the Future of
Patent-Antitrust Litigation: Walker Process and Handgards Meet Noerr-Pennington, 63 ArrRUST L.J.
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from antitrust liability because the monopolist who steals someone else's patent-
able invention in order to acquire a monopoly does not satisfy Brunswick's
nonpatentability element. As a consequence of this element, patent theft is
beyond the purview of antitrust law even if that fraudulently obtained patent
confers monopoly power on a patent thief who is not legally entitled to that
patent. Judge Posner asserted that "stealing a valid patent is not at all the same
thing, from an antitrust standpoint, as obtaining an invalid patent." 5 4 Thus,
although committing fraud to obtain an invalid patent can violate antitrust law,
stealing a valid patent cannot.
Judge Posner provided four related reasons for creating this new element of
nonpatentability for Walker Process liability: (1) patent theft merely transfers,
but does not create, market power; (2) patent theft does not harm consumer
welfare; (3) antitrust law is indifferent to the direct victims of patent theft; and
(4) patent theft does not satisfy the materiality requirement of Walker Process
liability. First, Judge Posner asserted that the theft of a valid patent merely
transfers market power from one party to another, and that antitrust law is
unconcerned about the transfer of market power. The Brunswick opinion states:
If the invention is patentable, it does not matter from an antitrust standpoint
what skullduggery the defendant may have used to get the patent issued or
transferred to him. The power over price that patent rights confer is lawful,
and is no greater than it otherwise would be just because the person exercising
the rights is not the one entitled by law to do So.
Judge Posner's rationale for immunizing patent theft from antitrust liability
assumes that patent theft does not create monopoly power. Judge Posner as-
serted that "[t]he theft of a perfectly valid patent ... creates no monopoly
power; it merely shifts a lawful monopoly into different hands. This has no
antitrust significance .... "5 6 Subsequent antitrust opinions have invoked Bruns-
wick in non-theft contexts to hold that antitrust law is indifferent as to who
holds a particular patent because consumer welfare is unaffected.5 1 Courts have
also adopted the Brunswick rationale on antitrust indifference to the transfer of
185, 198 n.48 (1994). In lieu of direct legal authority, Judge Posner draws an analogy to the materiality
element of fraud. See Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265.
54. Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 266.
55. Id. at 265.
56. Id. at 266.
57. See, e.g., PNY Techs., Inc. v. SanDisk Corp., No. C-11-04689 YGR, 2012 WL 1380271, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) ("With respect to this claim, the mere transfer of a valid patent 'has no
antitrust significance,' but merely shifts a lawful monopoly to different hands." (quoting Brunswick,
752 F.2d at 266)); Carefusion Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 10-CV-01111-LHK, 2010 WL 4509821,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010); see also Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law and Patent Misconduct in
the Proprietary Drug Industry, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1209, 1214 (1994) ("[I]f the defendant's inequitable
conduct merely resulted in the wrong individual being assigned inventorship, the consumer would not
have suffered an injury and the antitrust laws would not be applicable.").
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monopoly power and have applied it to non-patent scenarios.58 For example,
one court relied on Brunswick for the broad proposition that "[w]here a mo-
nopoly exists, from the standpoint of antitrust law it is a matter of indifference
whether one party versus another-in this case, one dealer versus another-
exploits the monopoly." 5 9 The logical inference is that because antitrust law is
not interested in who controls a particular patent, antitrust law must not be
concerned with patent theft.
The second rationale for the nonpatentability element focuses on consumer
welfare. Judge Posner asserted that the price to consumers would remain the
same regardless of who holds a particular patent. 6 0 This assumes that patent
theft affects neither the price nor level of output of the patented product, or
products created by the patented process.6 ' Judge Posner accused Brunswick
itself of being indifferent to consumer welfare as demonstrated by Brunswick
not seeking to have the patent invalidated, but instead asking that the patent be
transferred to Brunswick.62 Judge Posner reasoned that "no consumer interest
can be discerned even remotely in a suit brought by a competitor [because] ...
a victory for the competitor can confer no benefit, certain or probable, present or
future, on consumers."6 Even if Brunswick did not manufacture antistatic yarn
(as Riegel did) but instead licensed its patent, Judge Posner asserted that the
ultimate price to consumers would be the same because Brunswick would
extract a royalty from its licensees designed to have them charge consumers
the same monopoly price that a manufacturer-patentholder would charge.64
Invoking Brunswick, subsequent courts have expressed indifference as to patent
ownership because "consumers would simply be subjected to the monopoly
58. See Columbia River People's Util. Dist. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 217 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.
2000) ("[T]he [Brunswick] court pointed out that the market remained just as competitive as before the
theft; the question of who owns the patent monopoly is a 'matter of indifference' to the antitrust
laws."); JamSports & Entm't, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
59. Lerma v. Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1021 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (citing
Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 267); see also McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co., v. Matson Navigation Co.,
Civil No. 08-00080 JMSIBMK, 2008 WL 2233740, at *6 (D. Haw. Apr. 9, 2008) ("Conduct that
'merely shifts a lawful monopoly into different hands ... has no antitrust significance, although it hurts
the lawful owner of the monopoly power."' (quoting Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 266)).
60. See Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 267 ("From the standpoint of antitrust law, concerned as it is with
consumer welfare, it is a matter of indifference whether Riegel or Brunswick exploits a monopoly of
antistatic yam.").
61. See id. at 268.
62. Id. at 267 ("The nature of the remedy sought shows that Brunswick, far from contesting the
propriety of a patent monopoly of antistatic yarn, makes that propriety the very foundation for the
judicial relief that it seeks.").
63. Id. at 266.
64. Judge Posner explained:
As a rational profit-maximizer Brunswick would charge its licensees a royalty designed to
extract from them all the monopoly profits that the patent made possible; and the licensees
would raise their prices to consumers to cover the royalty expense. The price to the consumer
would be the same as it is, today, with Riegel the only seller in the market.
Id. at 267.
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patent rights of a different party."65 The underlying assumption of this rationale
is that so long as the patent could issue to someone, the patentholder's power
over price is constant and thus consumer welfare is unaffected by patent theft.66
Judge Posner next justified the nonpatentability element in Walker Process
cases by suggesting that antitrust law is unconcerned with the direct victims of
patent theft. Indeed, Judge Posner refused to characterize Brunswick as the
victim in the antitrust case because "[t]here is no contention that in asking for
[its patent back] Brunswick is motivated by altruism. It wants to make as much
money as it can from the patent-as much as Riegel made, or, if possible, even
more." 67 Judge Posner asserted that patent theft "has no antitrust significance,
although it hurts the lawful owner of the monopoly power."6 8 According to
Judge Posner, monopolization through patent theft cannot violate antitrust law
because no one was injured other than the true creator, who is not entitled to
antitrust sympathy because it wants the same monopoly that the defendant
has.6 9 The Brunswick opinion concluded that neither the true innovator nor
consumers paying the monopoly price have suffered an antitrust injury and that
therefore no plaintiff can bring an antitrust case for monopolization through
patent theft.
70
Judge Posner's fourth and final rationale for the nonpatentability element
focused on the materiality requirement for Walker Process liability. The Bruns-
wick opinion altered the traditional formulation of but-for materiality by holding
that
for a fraud to be material in an antitrust sense the plaintiff must show that but
for the fraud no patent would have been issued to anyone. If a patent would
have been issued to someone, the fraud could but have diverted market power
from the one who had the right to possess and exploit it to someone else.7 '
Judge Posner held that stealing an invention and misrepresenting it to the Patent
65. Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("The antitrust laws,
however, are concerned with consumer welfare and not with regulating the efforts of competing parties
to gain and utilize monopoly patent rights." (citing Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 267)); JamSports & Entm't,
LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting the Brunswick "court
could not find the 'consumer interest' in the case because consumers would not care who held the
patent and thereby became a monopolist in the antistatic yarn market").
66. One district court recently relied on Brunswick for the proposition that "invalidity is necessary
for a Walker Process claim is that a valid patent, even if procured by outright lies or thievery, does not
harm consumers, because they face the same circumstances that they would have even if the miscon-
duct had not occurred." King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 2014 WL 982848, at * II
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014) (citing Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265).
67. Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 267.
68. Id. at 266.
69. See id. at 268.
70. See id. ("It is then not a matter of the case having been brought by the wrong plaintiff . .. but of
there being no possible plaintiff because the defendant's conduct has no tendency to injure anyone
intended to be benefited by the antitrust laws.").
71. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
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Office as one's own is not material fraud because the patent could have issued
to someone else, namely the actual inventor.72 Some subsequent courts have
adopted Brunswick's new construction of materiality. 73
Applying his new test for Walker Process liability, Judge Posner held that
Brunswick's monopolization claim must fail as a matter of law because even if
Riegel stole Brunswick's invention, Brunswick failed to allege that the inven-
tion was not patentable.7 4 Indeed, Brunswick argued that it should have been
issued a patent on antistatic yam.75 Thus, neither was the alleged misrepresenta-
tion material nor did Brunswick suffer antitrust injury. According to Judge
Posner, Riegel's alleged theft did not create market power and did not harm
consumer welfare.7 6
The rationales that Judge Posner articulated for the Brunswick rule have
proven to be robust and durable in practice. Courts and commentators have
signed on to the Brunswick opinion's holding that in order for Walker Process
liability to attach, the fraudulently procured patent must be for a product that is
unpatentable. This nonpatentability element makes patent theft immune from
antitrust liability for illegal monopolization. Part III challenges the conventional
wisdom and explains the antitrust stake in patent theft.
72. See id.
73. For example:
For antitrust purposes, whether a patent could be issued matters more than who would
possess it; if a patent could still "have been issued to someone," its market power would still
have been concentrated (properly) in one party. As a result, Walker Process fraud must
concern a material issue of patentability; otherwise, a patent would have issued regardless of
any fraud, and potential plaintiffs would have suffered the same monopoly effects (but
legitimately).
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 693 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Brunswick,
752 F.2d at 265); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
("The fraud must be material in an antitrust sense in that the alleged infringer/antitrust counterclaimant
must show that but for the fraud no patent would have been issued to anyone." (citing Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
74. Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 266.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 266-67.
77. See, e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 2014 WL 982848, at *11 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 13, 2014) ("Thus, invalidity is a prerequisite to a successful Walker Process fraud claim.");
Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. W. Publ'g Co., No. 93 C 3074, 1994 WL 23008, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 1994);
Allen-Bradley Co. v. Autotech Corp., No. 86 C 8514, 1990 WL 16453, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1990)
(dismissing Walker Process claim in part because "defendants have not alleged that the inven-
tion sought to be patented was not patentable"); Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd.,
716 F Supp. 316, 334-35 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Rohm & Haas Co., 635 F. Supp. at 1221.
There is a perception that Judge Posner's position is dominant. See, e.g., Arun Chandra, Antitrust
Liability for Attempting to Enforce a Fraudulent Patent, 81 J. PAr. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 201, 214
(1999) ("Judge Posner's standard has increasingly been accepted by courts as the test for determining
materiality of the fraud committed."); Kobak, supra note 53, at 198 ("Many courts in Walker Process
cases added an objective element to the claim by requiring proof of 'but for' materiality: proof that, but
for the fraud, no patent would have issued. Judge Posner's decision in BrunswicklRiegel has proved
especially influential in this area." (footnote omitted)).
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III. THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PATENT THEFT
The Brunswick rule asserts that patent theft has no market effects because
each patent has associated with it a fixed amount of market power, which is
independent of which firm actually possesses the patent. Judge Posner assumed
that all firms behave the same upon acquiring a patent: Any firm in possession
of the patent will increase the price of the patented product and exclude
infringing competitors through the threat of litigation. This Part explains how
the conventional wisdom oversimplifies the matter because the anticompetitive
and anticonsumer effects of any particular patent may be a function of which
firm acquires the patent and how that firm acquired that patent.
A. PATENT THEFT CAN CREATE MARKET POWER
The nonpatentability element of the Brunswick test assumes that patent theft
does not create market power, but merely transfers it (albeit improperly) from
one party to another. The Brunswick opinion does not consider the presence of
substitute patents and whether some patentholders will behave differently than
others. But these are important factors in determining the relationship between
patent theft and market power.
In many markets, the exclusionary power of a patent may be a function of the
existence of competing patented technologies and their ownership. In Bruns-
wick, Judge Posner held that in order for there to be Walker Process liability, the
fraudulently obtained "patent must dominate a real market."7 Judge Posner's
formulation oversimplifies the relationship between patents and monopoly power.
A leading treatise notes that the Brunswick opinion "ignores the possibility that
the intellectual property owner may have market power as a result of the totality
of the circumstances, not just the fraudulently obtained patent."7 9 This follow-
ing discussion explores how, under various scenarios, patent theft can create
market power.
A patent thief could acquire or maintain monopoly power by misappropriat-
ing another's innovation even if the stolen patent did not itself dominate a
market. For example, this would be the case if a firm had a monopoly protected
by an existing dominant patent and realized that its rival had a competing,
noninfringing technology that was not yet patented.80 If two products, A and B,
78. 752 F.2d at 265.
79. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND
ANTITRUST § 11.4c n.251 (2d ed. 2013).
80. IP AND ANTITRUST explains:
By acquiring a related patent, the monopolist might prevent present or future competition
challenging its monopoly. The clearest case would be the acquisition of an equivalent patent
covering the only known economic alternative to the monopolist's product or process. Such an
acquisition forecloses potential competition by rivals who might otherwise have access to that
patent. Even the acquisition of one out of several equivalent patents might have exclusionary
effects. The acquired patent might, with further advances in the art, turn out to have been the
most promising.
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compete against each other, then neither alone defines a market, although the
two together do. Suppose that initially Firm X has a patent on product A and
consequently possesses monopoly power. Subsequently, Firm Y invents Product
B, which will compete against Product A, and should receive a patent on
Product B, but Firm X steals the idea for Product B from Firm Y. Firm X
commits fraud on the PTO and gets the patent instead. Firm X then has a
monopoly over the relevant market (defined as Products A and B). That firm
may choose to suppress the second patent, which would allow it to maintain its
monopoly power by thwarting competitive entry from the true innovator.8 ' Or,
it may exercise the patent and become the sole producer of both Products A and
B. Whether the patent thief suppresses or exercises the stolen patent, if a
monopolist misappropriates a rival's discovery and patents it, the defendant has
maintained its monopoly power through patent theft even though the stolen
patent does not dominate a market and the underlying innovation was patent-
able. 8 2 This example undermines Brunswick's articulation of the market domina-
tion element-and its creation of the nonpatentability element-because a
stolen patent could not define a market and yet the fraudulent procurement and
enforcement could nevertheless constitute illegal monopolization. If two patents
are substitutes, it matters who gets the second patent.83
Other areas of antitrust law besides Section 2 of the Sherman Act recognize
the anticompetitive threat posed by a single firm acquiring substitute patents.
For example, a conspiracy to put substitute patents within the control of a single
firm can violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which condemns agreements that
unreasonably restrain trade.84 Similarly, merger law prohibits one firm with a
Id. § 14.3a (footnotes omitted).
81. For example:
[I]n the Paper Bag patent litigation, which reached the Supreme Court in 1908, the dominant
firm had acquired a patent in a technology that competed with technology that it was already
using. It did not use the patent at all, preferring to stick with its existing technology, but it also
refused to license the patent to others and filed a successful infringement action against a rival
firm that apparently independently developed technology that infringed the acquired patent.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 3, 8 (2011) (discussing Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429
(1908)); see also CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOT-
ING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 295-99 (2012).
82. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTIrrRUST. AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK § 15.8, at 877 (2d ed. 2006).
83. For example:
[A] patent covering the only known procedure for making Z implies that the sole practitioner
of that process will also have a monopoly of the Z product market. But once two alternative
patents exist, each one of which will produce Z, each patent no longer connotes a monopoly of
the Z product market. To continue a monopoly of the Z product market, both patents must be
held in the same hands. The market monopoly is not conferred or protected by either patent
standing alone.
HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 79, at § 14.4.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963).
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patent from acquiring the patent rights to a substitute patent if that aggregation
of patents would result in the acquiring firm achieving market power. For
example, the FTC thwarted a merger that would have increased the surviving
"firm's ability unilaterally to exercise market power in the market for corn
herbicide for post-emergent control of broadleaf weeds, by combining the two
closest substitutes in the market."8 5
The antitrust agencies recognize that a particular patent could give monopoly
power to one firm even when it would not confer such power on another firm.
The Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, issued
jointly by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ.) Antitrust Division, provide that patent acquisition should be evaluated
using merger analysis. By way of example, the Guidelines note that if a newly
patented pharmaceutical challenges the only other approved drug on the market,
the maker of the existing drug cannot obtain de facto exclusive control (through
licensing or sale) of the newly patented drug because the arrangement would
eliminate competition in the relevant market.87 If it would violate antitrust law
for the defendant to buy the second patent, it should similarly violate antitrust
law for the dominant firm to acquire that same second patent through fraud on
the PTO.88
The stolen patent need not be for a fully realized product in order to allow a
patent thief to obtain or maintain monopoly power. Patent theft can reinforce
a monopolist's position by preventing the progression of technology. James
Kobak notes the "antitrust significance" of "the scenario of a monopolist with
control of an existing technology who wrongfully 'steals' from a prospective
new entrant the patent rights to the only competitive new technology on the
horizon."" Antitrust law recognizes how a monopolist can violate Section 2 by
preventing the evolution of technology. For example, Microsoft violated Section 2
when it stifled the evolution of browser technology in order to maintain its
monopoly power over operating systems. 90 Patent theft of nascent technology is
another anticompetitive act that can reinforce a monopolist's position.
The stolen patent also need not represent the state of the art for the theft to
have anticompetitive consequences. Even if the stolen second patent embodies
technology that is inferior to the existing technology controlled by the monopolist-
patentholder, "the acquisition of an inferior patent would have anticompetitive
effects whenever third parties had developed, subsequently developed, or subse-
quently would have developed improvements that make it equal or superior to
85. In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842, 852 (1997).
86. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 5.7 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
87. See id. § 5.7, ex. 11.
88. Indeed, the second form of acquisition is far less defensible than the first. See infra notes 239-44
and accompanying text.
89. Kobak, supra note 53, at 198.
90. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F3d 34, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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the monopolist's patent."91 A leading treatise notes that "even inferior tech-
nologies can provide some, if not perfect, competition to the patentee. Indeed,
high cost rivals or rivals making a somewhat inferior product provide more
competition than no rivals at all."92 This is consistent with the insight recog-
nized in antitrust law that even an inefficient competitor can discipline a
monopolist.
In sum, although Judge Posner assumed that a stolen patent must drive all
substitutes from the market in order for patent theft to be worthy of antitrust
concern,9 4 such is not the case if the thief controls the only other substitute
patent or patents.
B. PATENT THEFT CAN INCREASE PRICE
The Brunswick nonpatentability rule assumes that whoever possesses a particu-
lar patent is irrelevant to consumer welfare and, because antitrust is only
concerned with consumer welfare, antitrust is indifferent to which firm acquires
the patent-the true inventor or the thief.9 5 Judge Posner assumed that every
patentholder will behave in precisely the same way with a patent. For example,
he asserted that the fact that Brunswick was asking the court to order that the
patent issued to Riegel be transferred to Brunswick demonstrated that Bruns-
wick "wants to make as much money as it can from the patent-as much as
Riegel made, or, if possible, even more."9 That Brunswick might seek to earn
its returns on the patent through licensing instead of production would have no
effect on consumers, according to Judge Posner, because
[a]s a rational profit-maximizer Brunswick would charge its licensees a
royalty designed to extract from them all the monopoly profits that the patent
made possible; and the licensees would raise their prices to consumers to
cover the royalty expense. The price to the consumer would be the same as it
is, today, with Riegel the only seller in the market.97
Thus, Judge Posner asserted that the price paid by consumers is fixed and
unchangeable regardless of who owns a particular patent. He provided no
support for that assertion.
91. HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 79, § 14.3a.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 864 (D. Md. 1916).
94. See Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. W. Publ'g Co., No. 93 C 3074, 1994 WL 23008, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25,
1994) ("Commenting on the plaintiff's burden of proving market domination, Judge Posner has
indicated that courts must determine whether the patent threatens to 'drive all or most substitutes from
the market."' (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984))).
95. See Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265 ("The power over price that patent rights confer is lawful, and is
no greater than it otherwise would be just because the person exercising the rights is not the one entitled
by law to do so.").
96. Id. at 267.
97. Id.
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Not all inventors can or will pursue the same profit-maximizing strategy after
acquiring a patent. The true innovator may charge a lower price. Many innova-
tors may be constrained by contract and market conditions from exercising the
market power associated with their patents. If the patent thief is not similarly
constrained, it may be able to reduce output and increase price in a manner that
the true inventor cannot.
1. Variations in Patent Enforcement
Patent theft can increase price because the actual inventor may decide to
either not acquire a patent or not enforce it. Not every inventor entitled to apply
for a patent necessarily will file a patent application. Inventors may decline to
seek patent protection for many reasons. First, some firms may decide to protect
their invention as a trade secret instead of patenting it.98 Patent protection
requires the inventor to disclose her invention to the public.99 The patent right
to exclude infringing competitors for twenty years is granted as the reward for
disclosure. 00 In contrast, by treating her innovation as a trade secret, the
inventor does not have to disclose her invention, and trade secret protection
lasts as long as it takes for rivals to develop the innovation on their own. Firms
that would rather not disclose their inventions may eschew patent protection. ot
Second, some inventors may decline to patent their inventions because they
do not want to exclude anyone or limit the use of their discovery. For example,
during the fin de sibcle, a university professor invented a method for accurately
measuring the butterfat content of milk. 10 2 If the inventor had patented the
device, it "would doubtless have yielded him a very handsome income. [But he]
gave it freely to the public, saying modestly that to do so was but part of his
duty as a servant of the people. ... "3 More recently, when George Koehler
and Cesar Milstein created the technology for producing a particular type of
antibody-a discovery for which they won a Nobel Prize-they declined any
98. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 176 (2008) ("A survey of small high-tech firms indicates that the high
cost of getting and enforcing patents often leads them to choose trade-secret protection instead of patent
protection." (citation omitted)).
99. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 149-50 (2006);
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 81, 91.
100. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
101. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
result) ("State trade secret law . . . in its unlimited duration is clearly superior to the . .. monopoly
afforded by the patent laws. . . . [Tirade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial
disincentive to entrance into the patent system . . . ."). It is possible that the true inventor may fail to
secure a patent through inadvertence. For example, suppose the patent thief files a patent application
eleven months after the first public use of the invention but the true inventor waits until thirteen months
after that event. Under the Brunswick rule, the patent thief has acquired a patent that is otherwise valid.
However, a patent would not have issued to the true inventor because she waited more than a year after
the first public sale. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
102. See MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 19 (1982).
103. Id. (quoting F. W. TAUSSIG, INVENTORS AND MONEY-MAKERS 49-50 (1915)).
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patent rights, which facilitated significant research in this technology.' Univer-
sity researchers may be particularly inclined to share their innovations relatively
freely. 05
Even within the private sector, empirical research suggests that different
types of firms are more (or less) likely to enforce their patents. Some firms may
decline to enforce patents that other firms would aggressively enforce.10 6 For
example, Federal Circuit Judge Kimberly Moore's scholarship as a law profes-
sor suggests that foreign firms enforce patents less often than domestic firms. 0 7
Sometimes companies promise to not enforce their patents, as when IBM, Sun,
and Nokia pledged to limit their patent enforcement with respect to certain
open-source products.'
Some empirical research shows that small firms are less likely to enforce
their patents. High litigation costs make it harder for small firms to pursue
infringement litigation.' 09 They may not have the resources to go head-to-head
in drawn out litigation against a larger competitor."o Some small firms may be
104. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 154 (2004). Unfortunately, one firm sought
to commercialize the technology by creating successful applications of the technology and received
broad patent rights on diagnostic tests that use the antibodies. Id. Although a lower court held the
technology to be in the public domain, see Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 623 F. Supp.
1344, 1352-53 (N.D. Cal. 1985), the Federal Circuit reversed, see Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Noted scholars disagreed with the Federal
Circuit and noted that the opinion gave the follow-on firm "something like the broad pioneering
rights that had been renounced by the inventors themselves and their sponsors. This can only have led
to a lessening of competition in the market, as compared to the case that there was no patent on the
pioneering technology." SCOTCHMER, supra.
105. See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1557-58
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing real-world example of different companies' divergent enforcement),
abrogated in part by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
107. See Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1527 (2003)
("Thus, even though foreign inventors acquire patents as often as domestic firms, they seek to enforce
their patents only about one-eighth as often."); see also Scott K. Dinwiddie, A Shifting Barrier?
Difficulties Obtaining Patent Infringement Damages in Japan, 70 WASH. L. REV. 833, 857 (1995)
("Typically, Japanese corporations have not sought to aggressively enforce their patents. This failure to
enforce their patents may be because of a cultural predisposition to harmony, but it also may be because
most Japanese companies were playing 'catch up' and had more incentive to borrow new technology
from others than to try to protect their own.").
108. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still
Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 29-30 (2006) (discussing the pledges and their limitations).
109. See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1310 (2009) ("[S]tudies show that
even in the large firm surveys, relatively smaller firms tend to report a significantly higher sensitivity to
the costs of filing and enforcing patents."); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & EcON. 45, 45-46 (2004) ("The
perception is that litigation is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid, which pushes up patent
enforcement costs and makes it especially difficult for small firms to protect their intellectual prop-
erty.").
110. See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 961, 981 (2005) ("[Elven if an early-stage company had a patent, it is unlikely that it would have
resources available to enforce the patent through litigation against a competitor. That is particularly true
when the competitor is a large firm."). If they cannot afford attorneys' hourly rates, individual patentees
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handicapped by an inability to spread litigation costs over a large number of
valuable patents."' Moreover, small firms may also have a more difficult time
enforcing their patent rights through extrajudicial resolution because they are
not repeat players with large patent portfolios ripe for cross-licensing.1 2 How-
ever, some evidence suggests that "individual inventors and small companies
are much more likely to enforce their patents."" 3
It may be imprudent to make sweeping generalizations about patent enforce-
ment because enforcement patterns also vary by industry. 114 For every theory of
patent enforcement, there are counterexamples and competing hypotheses with
their own empirical-or anecdotal-support. That said, the evidence points to
one overarching truth: Not all patentholders behave similarly." 5 Some enforce;
others do not. Thus, Judge Posner's primary premise of the nonpatentability
element-that antitrust law should be indifferent as to who holds a particular
patent because all patentees will enforce that patent in precisely the same
way-is demonstrably false.
may only be able to sue when the expected damages and perceived probability of winning are
sufficiently high to convince a contingency-fee litigator to take the case. See Robert P. Greenspoon &
Catherine M. Cottle, Don't Assume a Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories with
Licensing and Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 194, 213 (2011). The financial
asymmetries in infringement litigation may cause smaller firms to avoid entire areas of innovation in
which large firms possess patents. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
15 (2004).
111. See Erin Shinneman, Note, Owning Global Knowledge: The Rise of Open Innovation and the
Future of Patent Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 935, 957 (2010) ("Small firms may be at a particular
disadvantage in terms of protecting their rights since they are not as well positioned to spread the cost
of litigation over large numbers of patents."); see also Bessen & Meurer, supra note 98, at 178 ("Big
firms can spread the fixed cost of monitoring for infringement over a larger number of patents.").
112. See Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 Hous. L.
REV. 1201, 1236-37 (2008) ("Patents are not a great source of value to the average small firm because
small firms have trouble enforcing, selling, and licensing their patents."); Paul J. LaVanway, Jr., Note,
Patent Licensing and Discretion: Reevaluating the Discretionary Prong of Declaratory Judgment
Jurisdiction After Medimmune, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1966, 1997 (2008) ("'[S]mall firms avoid R&D areas
where the threat of litigation from larger firms is high.' Moreover, because both trading patents and
repeated interactions in the marketplace are important for patent dispute resolution, individual inventors
and small firms are handicapped at enforcing their intellectual property rights through extrajudicial
resolution." (footnote omitted)); see also Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 109, at 47.
113. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 56
(2009).
114. See id. For example, software and Internet firms appear less likely to patent their innovation
and to enforce the patents that they do hold. See Graham et al., supra note 109, at 1313 ("Patenting and
enforcement costs are cited much more frequently by software and Internet firms as motives for not
patenting, a finding that is consistent with the lower significance ... that software firms ascribe to
patents as a means of securing competitive advantage."). In contrast, companies in the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology sector more aggressively enforce their patents. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo,
The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1370 (2009) ("Big companies in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, as well as small companies in both sectors, prefer strong
enforcement of their patents.").
115. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. Ill, 158-61 (2010).
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2. Regulatory or Institutional Constraints
If a government-affiliated actor acquires a patent, then she may not be able to
increase prices in the same manner that a private patentee could. An inventor's
acceptance of government funding may limit her ability to patent or otherwise
exercise the full exclusionary power of a patent. In the post-World War II era,
the federal government has become a major funder of R&D projects, but these
funds come with strings attached."' 6 As Suzanne Scotchmer has explained,
"Although norms vary from discipline to discipline, private firms usually
impose more restrictions on how the research outputs are used than government
agencies do.""' 7 For example, participation in the government-funded human
genome project obligates researchers to put their discoveries in the public
domain." 8 Commercialization at monopoly prices cannot occur when research-
ers are obligated to provide free access." 9 If a patent thief were not similarly
bound by these government restrictions, the thief could charge a higher price
than could the true inventor.
Litigation between FilmTec and Hydranautics illustrates the point.12 0 John
Cadotte worked for a not-for-profit research corporation on a government-
funded water desalinization project that used reverse osmosis membranes.
Cadotte left to form a for-profit corporation (FilmTec) to commercially manufac-
ture such membranes. Cadotte filed for a patent on his membrane and assigned
the patent rights to FilmTec. When FilmTec enforced its patent by suing
Hydranautics for infringement, Hydranautics argued that FilmTec's title to the
patent was defective because it was based on government-funded research.
Reversing a district court opinion, the Federal Circuit held that the patent
rightfully belonged to the U.S. government, not FilmTec.121 Meanwhile in
parallel litigation, Hydranautics brought an antitrust lawsuit against FilmTec for
illegally monopolizing the market for reverse osmosis membranes by bringing
sham litigation to enforce a fraudulently obtained patent.12 2 Through the vaga-
ries of civil procedure rules regarding compulsory counterclaims, both the
116. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 104, at 240 ("Innovations that originate with government funding
are made available to users under two sets of rules, which operate rather differently. We will call the
two sets of rules the commercialization model and the free-access model.").
117. Id. at 237.
118. See id. at 1 ("Some government funding, such as that for the human genome project, carries an
obligation to put the resulting knowledge in the public domain (available for free access). The output of
other government funding can be patented.").
119. See Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls?
The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving
in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REv. 631, 658-59 (2001) (advocating
that patented inventions based on federally funded research must be sold at reasonable prices).
120. See FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
121. See id. at 934 ("We held, for reasons related to Cadotte's employment at the time the invention
was conceived and in light of governing federal statute, that title to the invention was and always had
been in the United States, and that FilmTec was without standing to sue on the '344 patent.").
122. See Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 70 F.3d 533, 534 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Federal and Ninth Circuitsl23 issued opinions-in conflict-about whether
Hydranautics' antitrust claim could proceed.12 4 Neither court addressed the
issue as one of monopolization through patent theft-perhaps because under the
Brunswick rule, the underlying discovery was patentable,, though the patent
should have issued to the U.S. government. Yet, the facts of the litigation
underscore the principle that securing a monopoly through patent theft can
distort markets when a patent applicant lies to the Patent Office in order to have
a patent issued to a private party instead of a government entity.
University research departments are major recipients of government funding.
As federal research funds expanded after World War II, universities became less
dependent on industry funding. Federal law initially restricted the ability of
government-funded universities and their researchers to patent their inventions,
but the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 permitted it.12 5 Many universities have estab-
lished licensing offices that collect royalties.126 Yet even when they do patent,
universities may not enforce their patent rights as aggressively as private firms
do. Many universities do enforce their patent rights,127 particularly against
commercial infringers.12 8 Many other universities, however, "choose not to
pursue infringers, leading some commentators to opine that 'universities are
widely considered meek when it comes to enforcing their patents."' 2 9 Such
reticence may be a product of the legal, financial, and reputational risks
attendant to aggressive patent enforcement.130 Low-enforcement universities
may fear that a rigid view of IP rights could hamper collaboration and the
advancement of knowledge.' 3 ' Thus, despite Judge Posner's assertion that all
patentees would charge royalties that maximize profits, research has shown that
"most university licensing offices do not explicitly seek to maximize profits." 3 2
123. Compare id., with FilmTec Corp., 67 F.3d at 933-34.
124. See CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 120-23 (2011) (discussing the competing FilmTec opinions).
125. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 104, at 235.
126. See id.
127. See Christopher Larus, John K. Harting & Sharon Roberg-Perez, Patent Licensing and Assign-
ment with an Eye Toward Enforcement: Tips for University Patent Owners, LES NOUVELLES, Mar. 2013,
at 13, 13; Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent
Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 942 (2009); Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 936 (2006); see also
Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. CoLo. L. REV.
467, 477 (2008) (noting increased patenting by universities).
128. See Christopher M. Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us About the
Role of Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation?, 18 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 215, 260 (2009).
129. Jacob H. Rooksby, University Involvement in Patent Infringement Litigation, LES NOUVELLES,
Mar. 2012, at 8, 13 (quoting Marie Powers, Patent Litigation: Sometimes It's a Risk Worth Taking,
TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS, Mar. 2011, $ 1).
130. See id. at 10-12.
131. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 114, at 1368 ("While universities would like their property
rights enforced, they may not like strict property rights that do not allow collaboration or the use of
previous inventions to advance knowledge and research.").
132. SCOTCHMER, supra note 104, at 236.
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They instead balance the desire for royalties with the goal of disseminating
information and encouraging its use.
Patent theft can increase prices when the patent is stolen from university
researchers. For example, in the 1980s, two doctors at the University of
Colorado had conducted research studies on how the bodies of pregnant women
absorb the nutrients from vitamins. Their research demonstrated that by reduc-
ing the quantities of oxides and carbonates of calcium and magnesium in
vitamins, pregnant women could better absorb the iron in prenatal vitamins.
Throughout their research they had been in communication with a researcher
from pharmaceutical company American Cyanamid, Dr. Leon Ellenbogen.
The university doctors wrote an article reflecting their findings and submitted
it to the New England Journal of Medicine. They sent a draft of the article to
Dr. Ellenbogen, who took the university researchers' draft and converted it into
a patent application. He copied, without change, the graphs from the as-yet-
unpublished academic article. American Cyanamid filed the patent applica-
tion, listing Dr. Ellenbogen as the sole inventor. The PTO issued a patent to
American Cyanamid, which enforced its patent, including bringing infringe-
ment suits against at least six generic vitamin manufacturers.' 3 3 The uni-
versity doctors had never intended to patent their work, instead opting to
publish their findings widely.13 4 The University was not interested in max-
imizing profits.'
This act of patent theft distorted the market for years; American Cyanamid
and Dr. Ellenbogen affirmatively concealed their stolen patent from the univer-
sity doctors, who did not discover the patent theft until a decade later. The two
doctors at the University of Colorado had to go through a trial, and it took over
two decades after the theft for the case to be resolved in the doctors' favor.13 6
During those twenty years, consumers paid more than they would have but for
American Cyanamid's monopolization through patent theft.13 7 The American
133. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
134. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 (D. Colo.
2001).
135. See id. ("The gravamen of this case is that the Doctors never viewed the reformulation idea as a
financial opportunity and neither they, nor the University by virtue of the University Patent Policy, ever
intended to or would have sold exclusivity rights to the idea to Cyanamid in 1981."). Inventors care
about more than money. For example:
[S]cientists who made a significant breakthrough with the hypothalamus gland emphasized
their labor as a key aspect of their work: "Nobody before had to process millions of hypo-
thalami.... The key factor is not the money, it's the will . . . the brutal force of putting in
60 hours a week for a year."
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REv. 1745, 1776 (2012)
(quoting BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE 118 (1986)).
136. See id., Univ. of Colo. Found., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
137. By using the stolen patent to exclude competitors from the market, the patent thieves were able
to charge a monopoly price because potential rivals could not price discipline American Cyanamid due
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Cyanamid patent theft episode illustrates that while patent thieves may be
motivated by profit, the actual innovators may not be.' 3 8
The complexity of the rules associated with government funding need not be
mastered in order to appreciate the basic principle that the presence of federal
funding may affect the market power associated with a particular patent. The
nonpatentability element makes no allowance for the possibility that the patent
should have issued to a government-sponsored inventor who would be obligated
to dedicate the patent to the public domain or at least not charge a monopoly
price after it received a patent. And if a patentee were to steal an invention from
a university laboratory, the profit-maximizing thief would probably exercise the
patent rights differently-more aggressively, with higher royalties-than would
the true inventor if she instead had been awarded that same patent.
3. Contractual Constraints
A patent thief may also be able to charge a higher price than the true inventor
if the latter has contractually committed to not charge monopoly prices for her
intellectual property. When members of a standard-setting organization (SSO)
are choosing a standard to be adopted for a particular technological device, they
worry about the problem of patent holdup. Patent holdup occurs when a patent
owner waits until the patent is incorporated into a widely adopted standard, then
announces that all users of that standard are infringing on the patent and
demands an exorbitant royalty.
In order to guard against the threat of patent holdup, many SSOs impose two
requirements on their members. First, all members must disclose their intellec-
tual property rights in a timely manner so that decisionmakers can know
whether they are adopting a standard that incorporates an existing-or soon-to-
issue-patent.13 9 If a patent thief either does not belong to the relevant SSO or
conceals its wrongful possession of a relevant patent, then it may engage in
holdup.
Second, members of an SSO must agree that if their patent is incorporated
into a standard, the royalty that they charge will be fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRAND). Each FRAND commitment can be thought of as a
contractual obligation, an enforceable promise not to charge a monopoly price.
to the threat of an infringement suit. See Leslie, supra note 37, at 113-39 (noting that even a weak
patent can exclude competitors and allow the patentee to charge a supracompetitive price).
138. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found., 153 F Supp. 2d at 1242 ("Cyanamid's actions were motivated
by greed and a desire for the greater profits anticipated by the securing of exclusive, rather than general,
rights to the technology, in direct contravention of what the Doctors wanted and intended.").
139. The FTC has held that a patentholder can violate antitrust laws if it misrepresents to a
standard-setting organization that it does not own patent rights when it does and then seeks to enforce
those patent rights after they have been incorporated into an adopted standard. See In re Dell Computer
Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 618 (1996) (applying Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (2012)).
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Refusal to honor a FRAND commitment can constitute a breach of contract.140
For example, the Third Circuit has held that FRAND commitments are binding
and that a monopolist's refusal to honor its FRAND commitments after its
patented technology has been incorporated into an adopted standard in re-
liance on those commitments can constitute monopoly conduct for Section 2
liability.141
If the true inventor is constrained by a FRAND commitment, but the patent
thief is not, the awarding of the patent to the wrong monopolist can have
important anticompetitive implications. The patent thief can engage in patent
holdup, demanding an extortionate royalty that results in higher prices for goods
based on the adopted standard. Putting a patent in the hands of a firm that is not
constrained by a contractual FRAND commitment can raise the royalty rate
considerably.14 2 If the true innovator is encumbered by FRAND commitments,
consumers are far better off if the actual innovator secures the patent because
she cannot charge the monopoly price after the standard becomes entrenched.
4. Reputational Constraints
Judge Posner assumed that every firm sets a price that maximizes its profits
on each sale, but firms are sometimes constrained by political or public relations
considerations. Some patentees will not be able to charge a monopoly price
because of these reputational constraints. For example, firms generally do not
price gouge during emergencies. In the context of patents, one pharmaceutical
company may not be able to charge a monopoly price for a patented product
because of the public's ability to respond by boycotting the company's other
products.
The facts underlying a recent merger case (not involving patent theft) help
illustrate this principle. There are two drugs to treat patent ductus arteriosus
(PDA), a life-threatening heart condition that every year affects tens of thou-
sands of low-birth-weight, usually premature, babies.14 3 Two drugs could treat
the condition: Indocin IV and NeoProfen. The pharmaceutical giant Merck
owned the rights to Indocin IV and charged $77.77 per treatment. Lundbeck,
Inc., another pharmaceutical company, acquired Indocin IV from Merck and
raised the price. A year later, Lundbeck acquired the contingent U.S. rights to
NeoProfen, which had not yet been approved by the FDA to treat PDA, from
140. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1-2 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F Supp. 2d 788, 790-91 (N.D.
Tex. 2008).
141. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Michael A.
Carrier, Patent Assertion Entities: Six Actions the Antitrust Agencies Can Take, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON.,
Jan. 2013, at 2, 5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209521 (discussing example of attempted
evasion of FRAND commitment).
142. See In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FILE 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308, at *38 (F.T.C.
Jan. 22, 2008).
143. See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 2011).
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Abbott Laboratories. '"A mere two days after it acquired the rights to NeoProfen,
Lundbeck raised the price of Indocin IV by almost 1300% to over $1,500.145
The different pricing behavior of the two pharmaceutical companies shows the
importance of who owns a particular patent. Basic economic theory would
suggest that Merck could have raised the price considerably in order to maxi-
mize its profits on Indocin IV. But Merck was constrained by public relations
concerns. Writing a concurrence in an earlier case not involving Lundbeck, FTC
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch explained that
Merck had a large product portfolio that included a number of pharmaceutical
products that were more profitable than Indocin. It is arguable that if it sold at
a monopoly price a product used to treat premature babies, that could damage
its reputation and its sales of those more profitable products.14 6
Lundbeck was not similarly constrained. It purchased the rights to Indocin IV
from Merck and eventually raised the price thirteen-fold, ultimately settling on
a price of $1,614 per treatment, more than it was charging for NeoProfen. 14 7
Although the case involves a voluntary sale of a patent, not patent theft, the
facts of the case illustrate the point that who owns a patent can have important
consequences for the price of the patented product. Consider a hypothetical:
suppose that Lundbeck had a patent on NeoProfen and Merck was developing
Indocin IV but had not yet patented it. Under this scenario, if Lundbeck had
committed fraud on the PTO by misappropriating Merck's data and misrepresent-
ing itself as the inventor of Indocin IV, it would acquire the patent for Indocin
IV and charge a price of $1,600 per treatment. Under the Brunswick rule, even
if Lundbeck had monopolized a relevant product market, it would have com-
mitted no antitrust wrong because consumers are allegedly indifferent to this
patent theft. The actual market data from the merger case, however, shows that
consumers were absolutely worse off if Lundbeck controlled the patent instead
of Merck. If Lundbeck had acquired monopoly power through patent theft, it is
wrong to suggest, as Brunswick holds, that antitrust law must stand down
because consumers are unaffected.
C. PATENT THEFT DISTORTS INNOVATION
The conventional wisdom-that patent theft does not give rise to antitrust
liability so long as the true inventor would be entitled to a patent-also fails
144. See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL
3810015, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
145. Id.; Lundbeck, 650 F.3d at 1238.
146. Concurring Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, FTC v. Ovation Pharm., Inc., FTC
(2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/081216ovationroschstmt.pdf.
147. Lundbeck, 650 F.3d at 1238. The Eighth Circuit rejected the FTC's challenge to Lundbeck's
acquisition of Indocin IV in an opinion that has proven controversial. See Christopher R. Leslie,
Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885, 907-08 (2012).
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to appreciate the distinction between static and dynamic competition. Judge
Posner claimed that the nonpatentability requirement was appropriate "to pre-
serve the health of the competitive process."l 4 8 Yet he defined this goal nar-
rowly to mean only "discourag[ing] practices that make it hard for consumers
to buy at competitive prices."1 4 9 This characterization confuses static and
dynamic competition. Static competition focuses primarily on price; it empha-
sizes the importance of markets where multiple firms compete for sales by
offering consumers a lower price. Dynamic competition, in contrast, focuses
on improving products or supplanting product categories altogether, as when
CD players replaced record players.15 0 The competitive process includes facilitat-
ing both lower prices and better products.' 5 ' Judge Posner's analysis focused
solely on static competition, namely short-term price. His reasoning ignored
dynamic competition considerations, including the need to reward true inven-
tors in order to facilitate investments in R&D. The prospect of financial rewards
is what motivates firms and people to engage in research and development. If a
firm is denied protection for its ideas, then it has a diminished incentive to
innovate.
Patents help ensure that inventors can recoup their investment in innova-
tion. The patent system provides the foundation of America's innovation re-
gime. Patents are often necessary to spur innovation in a competitive market-
place because R&D efforts entail large upfront costs. If innovators could not
exclude rivals, at least temporarily, then innovative firms would not be able
to recoup these costs because competitors without research costs could under-
price innovators.15 2 One reason that firms invest in R&D is the probability
of securing a valuable patent that allows the inventor to charge a supra-
competitive price, providing for recoupment and eventually a stream of mo-
nopoly profits.' 53 If a firm predicts-or fears-that it will not recoup its total
investment in innovation, it will invest less-and perhaps nothing-on re-
search.15 4 The profits from a successful patented product must be sufficiently
148. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984).
149. Id.
150. See LESLIE, supra note 124, at 23-24. On the distinction between static and dynamic efficiency,
see Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Presentation to
the George Mason University School of Law Symposium: Interoperability Between Antitrust and
Intellectual Property (Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
218316.htm#N 3 .
151. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1182 (1st Cir. 1994),
abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
152. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1466-67 (2002).
153. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 761 (2009) ("Patent protection incentivizes invention because it gives the
inventor an ability to recoup her research and development costs. Patents do this by giving the patent
holder the ability to exclude competitors and control price." (footnote omitted)).
154. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 152, at 1467 ("Unauthorized reproduction would
drive down the market price to the cost of copying, original authors and inventors would not be able to
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high to recoup the R&D expenditures in that particular product, as well as all of
the research projects that failed to generate marketable products. Otherwise, the
firm's overall R&D program operates at a net loss and should be scaled back or
eliminated.
Patent theft may prevent innovators from recouping their investments in
R&D. If inventions can be stolen and patented by others, the incentive to
conduct research in the first place is diminished.' 5 5 The inventor has not simply
been robbed of its patent; it has been robbed of the temporary stream of
monopoly profits. Surprisingly, Judge Posner in his Brunswick opinion seem-
ingly sang the praises of patent theft, arguing that
if anything, competitive pricing is more likely if Brunswick loses this suit
than if it wins it. If Brunswick is confident that Riegel's patent is invalid, it
can go into the antistatic-yarn business itself, with little fear of being held
liable for patent infringement; and by entering, it will inject some competition
into that market for the first time.156
But this analysis fails to recognize that even if patent theft increases com-
petition in the short-term,' 57 it does so by preventing recoupment by the true
innovator and thus reduces the incentive to innovate. If the rightful patentee
knows that its patent can be stolen and that it will not recoup its research or
other fixed costs, then it will be less likely to undertake these expenses in the
first place, even though they increase social wealth.
Patent theft, however, has worse consequences for innovators than just not
being able to charge a monopoly price because patent theft can prevent the
inventor from practicing its own innovation. The rival's possession of a stolen
patent acts as a barrier to entry against the true innovator. In the aftermath of
patent theft, the innovator is worse off having engaged in research than if it had
not invested in innovation. As an initial matter, the innovator is out the money,
time, and other resources that were invested but will not be recouped if the
innovator does not obtain a patent in its own name. Additionally, the innovator
is at risk of "infringing" a patent on its own invention. It may have to pay
recover their expenditures on authorship and R&D, and, as a result, too few inventions. . . would be
created.").
155. See WARD S. BowMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTIRUST LAw: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMic APPRAISAL 33
(1973) ("The principal justification for patents ... is the need to foreclose rapid copying by others.
Thus, a patent system is a corrective for underinvestment in innovation."); see also BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 98, at 163 ("Poor prior art search necessitates that some patents will be awarded to someone
other than the actual first inventor; this can cause problems for the true innovators.").
156. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984). It is also the case
that if an innovation bandit steals an inventor's idea and sells it or makes public use of it, the true
inventor may be prevented from patenting his own idea if the thief's activities occur more than one year
before the inventor files its patent application. See Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125
F.3d 1448, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As such, as Posner argues, patent theft may seem to benefit
consumers in the short run.
157. This seems unlikely because patent theft may exclude the actual innovator from the market.
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royalties to manufacture the product that it invented; alternatively, it may be
excluded from the market altogether if the patent thief refuses to license the
stolen invention.
The Brunswick rule fails to appreciate how patent theft can exclude the true
innovator from the market. In response to Brunswick's argument that the
alleged patent theft by Riegel deprived Brunswick of the ability to license
other manufacturers to produce the antistatic yarn that it invented because
licensees would fear an infringement suit by Riegel, Judge Posner said that
Brunswick could easily solve the problem by simply indemnifying the licens-
ees. 15 8 His assertion is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, why would
anyone pay Brunswick for a license when Brunswick does not have a patent
and another firm does? Licensees would license from Riegel, not Brunswick,
because Riegel could still sue for infringement while Brunswick could not.
Second, indemnification is not free. It costs time and money to negotiate an
indemnification clause,' 59 and Brunswick would likely pay higher insurance
premiums to undertake the risk of litigation. Third, indemnification does not
solve the problem for licensees who do not wish to be dragged into court
and have their time and energy absorbed in drawn-out patent litigation even
if Brunswick ultimately pays any damages. Finally, it is unclear whether
indemnification is as easy as the Brunswick opinion suggests. Judge Posner
betrayed a weakness in his argument by noting that "Brunswick, a large
corporation, can afford to indemnify its licensees," which implicitly conceded
that the smaller firm that has had its patent stolen may be unable to indemnify
licensees.16 0
The theft of the patent raises the true inventor's costs. The rightful owner of
the patent is not merely being denied a stream of monopoly profits that it could
earn. It may incur litigation costs either in a suit to challenge the patent theft or
as a defendant in an infringement suit brought against it by the patent thief. The
litigation costs associated with such patent litigation can be very high. 161 The
true innovator also runs the risk of the court or jury reaching the wrong
result.162 Thus, even though the rightful patentholder knows that the monopo-
158. See Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 267-68.
159. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
abrogated by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
160. Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 268; see also Ritchie, supra note 4 (noting how alleged inventor of
product could not license her invention because potential licensees feared litigation from larger firm
that allegedly engaged in patent theft).
161. Patent litigation typically costs millions of dollars. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N,
REPORT OF THE EcoNoMic SURVEY 35 (2011). These litigation costs are recoverable in antitrust litigation,
but not other forms of legal redress that the actual innovator might consider, such as a breach of
contract suit. See infra section IV.B.
162. See Leslie, supra note 37, at 135-36 (noting that juries are generally pro-patentholder);
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99
MicH. L. REV. 365, 386 (2000) (same).
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list's patent is invalid, that patent nevertheless creates a barrier to entry by
raising the true inventor's costs. Patent theft may also hamper innovation by
forcing the diversion of the actual inventor's research budget. After having its
patent stolen, the true innovator's fear of infringing the stolen patent may force
it to engage in costly attempts to design around the patent that is illegitimately
held by its rival. The design-around process can prove to be expensive, waste-
ful, and ultimately futile depending on the scope of the patent.16 3 Despite the
possibility of design-around activity in some markets, in many industries, such
as biotechnology and software, a monopolist's possession of a patent with
suspect validity "may lead its competitor to forgo R&D in the areas that the
patent improperly covers."'6" The Brunswick opinion, however, overlooks the
exclusionary effects of the stolen patent on the firm that should have received
the patent.
Patent theft also distorts patent races. A patent race refers to the competition
between firms in an industry to make research breakthroughs and patent them
before their rivals do. The FTC has recognized that "competition to win a patent
right may drive a race to innovate."' 6 5 Patent races get products to market
sooner.16 6 Although the issuance of the patent may lead to higher prices over the
life of the patent (or until a noninfringing substitute enters the market), the race
for the patent leads to the development of better products, one of the basic goals
of competition. Races have costs-such as encouraging duplicative research,
which could be deemed wasteful-but on balance "such competition generates
better consumer products and lower prices, benefits that may outstrip any social
loss from the patent race, some observe."' 6 7
Patent theft undermines the dynamic of innovation-encouraging patent
races. When firms know that they are competing for the patent, they calculate
the probability and value of winning the patent race against the expected costs
of competing in it.'6 8 If the race to the Patent Office does not have fair rules that
are properly enforced, innovative firms will have less incentive to participate in
that competition. Inventors may have insufficient incentive to invest in innova-
tion if their ideas can be stolen and the inventor is subsequently excluded from
the market for a product that it alone developed.
Patent theft also distorts innovation by diverting research funds away from
innovative entities. The true inventor may be more likely to reinvest any
163. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy,
34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1271-72 (2009); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 98, at 47.
164. FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY
5-6 (2003) [hereinafter FTC INNOVATION REPORT].
165. Id. ch. 2, at 2.
166. See id. ch. 2, at 21; see also John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 439, 467 (2004) (noting that patent races will result in patents expiring sooner).
167. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 164, ch. 2, at 16.
168. See BOWMAN, supra note 155, at 22-23; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 98, at 250
(explaining the economics of winner-takes-all patent races).
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monopoly profits in R&D.169 For example, universities reinvest much of their
royalties into more innovation and research. The true innovator may also be
more likely to improve upon the original patent because it would not be subject
to a blocking patent. If its original patent was stolen, the true inventor may be
less likely to research improvement patents. Patent theft may make it harder for
true inventors to secure funding.170 In short, who receives the monopoly profits
from the patent can affect the stream of future innovation.
Even if the patent thief is otherwise an innovative firm, the prospect of
stealing a rival's invention also reduces the thief's incentive to innovate. In
some cases, the firm that steals a patent may be the firm that but for that theft is
most likely to develop a substitute for that patent. For example, in the Bruns-
wick case, Riegel was far more likely to design around the patent for antistatic
yam and develop a noninfringing substitute than was Brunswick. Brunswick
never intended to manufacture the antistatic yam, but merely to license it.' 7 1 If
the patent had been awarded to Brunswick in the first place, Riegel-as the
manufacturer of specialized yam-would have a relatively powerful incentive
to develop a competing product. If Riegel acquired Brunswick's patent through
theft, Riegel no longer had a strong incentive to develop a noninfringing
substitute. In this scenario, patent theft had the effect of reducing the net amount
of research and innovation in the relevant market.
Finally, patent theft hampers innovation when the true inventor would rather
share its discovery with the world. The fear of patent theft could deter scientists
from utilizing the peer review process at prestigious journals. 1 7 2 The patent
theft in the American Cyanamid case thwarted the doctors' desire to share
their invention with the market.17 3 Patent theft deprives the true innovator of its
right to not patent its innovation, to not exclude others from benefiting from it,
and to encourage others to experiment with and improve upon a foundational
insight.174
In sum, patent theft reduces both competition and consumer welfare. The
competition for patents forms a critical part of innovation policy in America.
Consumers suffer a loss of welfare in the long run if innovators invest less in
169. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 39-40 (2009) (noting incentives of the original innovator to continue to improve its invention
in light of the patent doctrine of equivalents).
170. See Richard Allen, Guarding Those Winning Ideas, Bus. REv. WKLY., July 2, 1993, available at
1993 WLNR 5510035.
171. See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that
Brunswick was not a textile manufacturer).
172. See Kathleen Day, Patents and Peer Pressures; Two Firms' Legal Fight May Shake a Mainstay
ofScientific Research, WASH. PosT, Apr. 19, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 6569918.
173. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 (D. Colo.
2001).
174. See id. at 1245 (Patent theft "betrayed the Doctors and deprived both them and the University
of their prerogative not to patent the Doctors' invention or to exclude others from benefitting from it.").
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the research and production of new goods because the possibility of patent theft
reduces the expected benefits of their activities.
D. PATENT THEFT CREATES INEFFICIENCY
Antitrust law cares about efficiency. Indeed, in his academic writing,
Judge Posner has argued "the only goal of antitrust law should be to promote
efficiency in the economic sense."' 7 5 So it is particularly surprising that in
holding that antitrust law is indifferent to patent theft, Judge Posner neglected to
discuss the efficiency implications of patent theft. Yet patent theft can make
markets less efficient in several ways. This section considers three.
1. Patent Theft and Patent Suppression
Patent theft can create inefficiency if the thief decides not to practice the
patent. Early American patent law required patentholders to use their patents.
For example, one district court judge in 1886 held that a patentee "is bound
either to use the patent himself or allow others to use it on reasonable or
equitable terms."' 7 6 In 1858, the Supreme Court opined that the patent grant
"was never designed for [an inventor's] exclusive profit or advantage."' 7 7 The
Court later changed course and held that patentees could suppress their inven-
tions17 8 because the patent owner "has no obligation either to use it or to grant
its use to others."' 7 9 As the law stands, a patentholder is legally entitled to
suppress its patent, neither manufacturing patented products nor licensing others
to use the patent. 1so
175. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTRUST LAw 2 (2d ed. 2001).
176. Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 212 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886). In this case, the court refused to grant an
injunction against a user of a patented printing press because the patentee was not using his invention
commercially. See id. Early patent law cared about who acquired the patent and treated domestic and
foreign patent holders differently. For example, pursuant to a 1832 federal statute, aliens who held U.S.
patents were required to make public use of their patent within one year of issuance or the patent would
be void. See Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) ("A violation of the
law rendered the patent void. The act was repealed in 1836.").
177. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858).
178. The Court explained in Continental Paper Bag Co.:
As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent, we
answer that such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred
by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without
question of motive.
210 U.S. at 429.
179. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945).
180. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("A patent is granted in
exchange for a patentee's disclosure of an invention, not for the patentee's use of the invention. There is
no requirement in this country that a patentee make, use, or sell its patented invention."). In the Patent
Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Congress amended the patent statute to read: "No patent owner otherwise
entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having .. . refused to
license or use any rights to the patent . . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
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Despite its legality, patent suppression is inconsistent with the patent system's
"reasonable expectation that [the patentee] will either put his invention to
practical use or permit others to avail themselves of it upon reasonable terms." t8
Justice Douglas observed in 1945 that suppressing patented inventions
retard[s], rather than promote[s], the progress of the useful arts.. .. The use of
a new patent is suppressed so as to preclude experimentation which might
result in further invention by competitors. A whole technology is blocked off.
The result is a clog to our economic machine and a barrier to an economy of
abundance.' 82
Thus, although the patentee has the legal right to suppress the patent, the patent
system was designed "to get new products into the marketplace during the
period of exclusivity so that the public receives full benefits from the grant." 83
A monopolist may want to steal a patent for a potentially competing product
and then suppress that invention altogether in order to maintain its current
monopoly position.18 4 This would be the case if the monopolist controlled
substitute patents and decided to practice one patent while suppressing the
other, ensuring that no rival could use the second patented technology to make a
competing product.'8 5 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp notes that
nonuse of acquired IP rights can threaten competition, particularly when the
acquired right is a substitute for the purchaser's current technology. Suppose a
dominant firm is making widgets with process A and a different firm develops
and patents a substitute process B, which is as good or better than A. Why
would the first firm want to purchase an exclusive right to process B?
Presumably, it might wish to change processes immediately, or employ both
processes together. Then again, the firm may simply want to "shelve" process
B so that others will not be able to use it. In the pure case-of the purchaser
who intends never to use process B-the acquisition is a naked restraint. That
is, the purchase does nothing to reduce the costs or enhance the output of the
purchasing firm. The transaction is profitable only because of its success in
suppressing the output of a rival.' 86
181. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'1 Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90 (1902); see also Woodbridge v.
United States, 263 U.S. 50, 55-56 (1923) ("Congress relies for the public benefit to be derived from the
invention during the monopoly on the natural motive for gain in the patentee to exploit his invention
and to make, use, and vend it or its product or to permit others to do so, for profit.").
182. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382-83 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted).
183. Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1562.
184. See supra section III.A (discussing substitute patents).
185. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining the
economics of patent suppression).
186. HERBERr HOVENKAMP, THE ANTrRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 271 (2005) (empha-
sis omitted).
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A patentholder who would practice or license the patent to others is strongly
preferred over a patentholder who would suppress the patent. If a patent were
stolen and then suppressed, this would generate inefficiency and harm con-
sumers by denying them access to technological improvements . Neither the
patent system nor antitrust law condemns patent suppression per se. However, if
a competitor engages in anticompetitive conduct in order to receive a patent that
it suppresses-whereas the legitimate owner of the patent would have practiced
the patent-then inefficiency is created because the patent went to the "wrong
party." Even though patent suppression does not constitute patent misuse, an
antitrust regime that cares about efficiency should condemn monopolization
through patent theft coupled with suppression.
2. Efficient Innovators and Inefficient Thieves
Even assuming that both the true inventor and the patent thief may try to
practice the patent, the former may be more efficient than the latter. If the true
inventor is more efficient, then it may be more likely to get the product to
market. Securing a patent is but one step on the road to commercializing an
invention. Not every firm is equally equipped to convert a patented idea into an
abundance of sellable products. It is reasonable to expect that in some cases the
true inventor would have a better understanding of the product, its capabilities,
and its limitations. As the firm that understands the technology more intimately,
the true innovator may be in a better position to operationalize the patent. 88
The true patentholder may have resources or expertise that will help get the
product to market quicker or more efficiently.18 9
Furthermore, in most cases, it would seem likely that the actual inventor
understands the product, including production methods, better than a company
that merely steals the inventor's research. The firm's cost structure and its
access to capital may determine how much product the firm produces and at
what price it markets the product. The legitimate inventor may be better able to
translate the patent into a desirable product. No data exists on the relative
187. A leading treatise explains:
Suppose the monopolist refuses to license its patents, or alternatively, pursues a policy of
purchasing all the technology in its field; however, in most cases it simply "retires"
the intellectual property rights at issue, not producing under them itself and refusing to
license any others. In this way the monopolist denies others competitive access to its
market, while perhaps not taking advantage of technological improvements that would benefit
consumers.
HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 79, § 14.4.
188. Different firms have different cost structures. Holding a revenue curve constant, a monop-
olist with lower costs will produce a greater quantity at a lower price than a monopolist with higher
costs.
189. This was not true for Brunswick, which licensed the technology that it claimed Riegel had
stolen from it. See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting
that Brunswick was not a textile manufacturer).
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efficiency of innovators versus patent thieves, and no claims are made here that
patent thieves are necessarily less efficient. Nevertheless, the possibility remains
that patent theft may exclude the more efficient producer from the market.'90 If
so, antitrust principles are implicated when monopolization is achieved through
patent theft.
3. Patent Licensing and Efficiency
In the event that the innovator is not the most efficient manufacturer or seller,
it may consider licensing its innovation. Like any voluntary contract, a patent
license is mutually beneficial. The licensee gets access to useful technology
and the licensor earns a royalty.19' Such royalties can be a powerful stimulus
for innovation, especially for innovators without manufacturing capability.19 2
For many technologies, licensing ensures that a particular innovation is operation-
alized at all; otherwise, no consumer benefits would flow directly from the
advance in know-how. For example, when a company invents a new product
but lacks sufficient manufacturing capacity, licensing a qualified manufacturer
ensures that consumers have access to the new product. Multiple licensees can
improve the competitive landscape even more by competing against each
other-such as by offering valuable services-and perhaps by enhancing the
product in the hopes of obtaining an improvement patent.
Many valuable technologies remain unused because the market for technol-
ogy licenses is fragmented and imperfect.19 3 It can be difficult for technology
owners and potential users of that technology to link up. Licensing trade secrets
is particularly tricky because
with complex technologies, the prospective licensee or purchaser often lacks
information about the quality of the technology. The inventor wants to convey
information about the technology in order to conclude the transaction. One
way to do this is to reveal some technical details, but doing so might expose
the inventor to a risk of expropriation ... .194
190. Whether the excluded producer is actually more efficient than the patent thief is not an element
of liability; monopolization through patent theft should violate Section 2 regardless. These efficiency
arguments present broad-based policy rationales for why this category of conduct-patent theft-is an
appropriate concern of antitrust law.
191. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 104, at 161 ("Licensing is generally good for both users and inno-
vators, since it increases the use of knowledge."); see also Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964)
(The "patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that
monopoly.").
192. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 79, § 14.3b ("Many patented innovations
are developed by people or firms who lack the capacity or desire to practice the patent themselves. For
them, the incentive to innovate comes entirely from their ability to license the patent to others.").
193. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 98, at 179-83.
194. Id. at 184 (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIREcnON OF INVENTIVE Acrivrry ECONOMIC AND SocIAL FACTORs 609,
609-25 (1962)).
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The threat of patent theft renders the market for technology licensing less
efficient because if patent theft appears to be cost-beneficial, then innovative
firms will have less incentive to license their trade secrets. Misappropriation of
another's patent-of the type alleged in Brunswick-reduces innovation and
consumer welfare by making it harder for patentees to license patents due to
fear of theft by the licensee. The threat of patent theft injures consumers by
creating a disincentive to license trade secrets.
In sum, although licensing is efficient, the risk of patent theft may reduce an
innovator's willingness to license its trade secrets to other companies.
IV. ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR MONOPOLIZATION THROUGH PATENT THEFT
In Walker Process, the Supreme Court held that enforcing a patent acquired
through fraud on the PTO constitutes monopoly conduct.195 Thus, if the
plaintiff can also establish that the patentee-defendant possesses monopoly
power, a prima facie case of illegal monopolization has been established.196
This Part explains how patent theft falls within the reach of Walker Process
and how monopolization through patent theft satisfies the elements of the
Grinnell test.
A. MONOPOLIZATION THROUGH PATENT THEFT VIOLATES SECTION 2
To prove a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must satisfy
the two elements of the Grinnell test, namely, that the defendant possesses
monopoly power in a relevant market and that it has engaged in monopoly
conduct to acquire or maintain that power.'9 7 In addition to these two elements,
a private plaintiff must also show that it has suffered antitrust injury, which is an
injury caused by a reduction in competition. If the plaintiff can establish the
prima facie case for Section 2 liability, the defendant can still escape liability if
it can show that it had a legitimate business justification for engaging in the
challenged conduct.
1. Monopoly Power
Stealing a patent does not automatically create antitrust problems. Section 2
of the Sherman Act requires that the defendant possess monopoly power in a
relevant market. This is the first element of the Grinnell test. Thus, the plaintiff
must prove that the patent thief is a monopolist.'9 8 That said, stolen patents may
be more likely to confer market power than the average patent. A patent that is
worth stealing is one that the thief likely perceives will give the patentholder the
195. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
196. See id. ("We have concluded that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent
Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case
are present.").
197. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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ability to charge a supracompetitive price by excluding competitors. Otherwise,
the theft is not worth the risk.' 99
The Brunswick opinion's holding that "[tlhe patent must dominate a real
market" is an attempt to operationalize the fact that not all patents confer market
power.2" The Supreme Court recognized this in Walker Process when it held
that patent fraud alone did not establish a violation of Section 2.201 Courts and
commentators uniformly agree that maintaining a patent does not automatically
confer monopoly power.20 2 Thus, in Walker Process litigation, the antitrust
plaintiff must independently prove that the defendant possesses monopoly
power in a relevant market, Grinnell's first element. Judge Posner correctly
noted that a patent may not confer market power if the invention has no
commercial value or if noninfringing substitutes exist.20 3 However, an indi-
vidual patent need not "dominate a real market" in order to confer monopoly
power on the patentholder. As shown in section III.A, if the stolen patent is the
only substitute for the thief's patented technology, a monopolist can maintain its
market power through patent theft even though the stolen patent does not itself
dominate a real market.204
2. Monopoly Conduct
Patent theft should constitute monopoly conduct. This section explains
how monopolization through patent theft "tends to impair the opportunities of
rivals" and "does not further competition on the merits," thus satisfying the
touchstone for monopoly conduct articulated in Aspen Skiing.2 05 In Grinnell,
the Supreme Court held that a monopolist is not in violation of Section 2 if its
monopoly power is the "consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident." 2 0 6 The patent thief has not created a superior product; he has
stolen someone else's. And while some might describe entering a confidentiality
agreement in order to gain access to and steal another firm's trade secrets as
199. The risks of patent theft include potential liability for violating various state laws. See infra
notes 218-19 and accompanying text. These state remedies may not, however, be sufficient to deter
patent theft and to compensate all of the victims of patent theft. See infra notes 251-55 and
accompanying text.
200. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984).
201. See Walker Process Equip., 382 U.S. at 177.
202. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) ("[T]he mere fact that a
tying product is patented does not support [a market power] presumption."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &
FTC, ANTrrRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.2 (1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf ("The Agencies will not presume that a patent,
copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner.")
203. See Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265-66.
204. Judge Posner's opinion also overlooks that Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns attempted
monopolization. Although Walker Process liability exists for both illegal monopolization and attempted
monopolization, the Brunswick decision "ignores the possibility of an attempt claim based on a
dangerous probability of success." HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 79, § 11.4c n.25 1.
205. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985).
206. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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"business acumen," antitrust law does not.
Patent theft should satisfy the monopoly conduct element of the Grinnell test
because patent theft is a species of patent fraud. In Walker Process, the Supreme
Court held that acquiring or maintaining monopoly power by procuring a patent
through fraud on the Patent Office is monopoly conduct. 2 0 7 Holding aside
Brunswick's request that the patent be assigned to it, Riegel's alleged conduct
looks like a traditional Walker Process violation, in that the antitrust defendant
acquired a monopoly by committing fraud on the Patent Office and then used
this fraudulently obtained patent to exclude competitors.
An antitrust cause of action based on Walker Process requires that the patent
fraud be material. "Materiality is shown if 'but for' the misrepresentation, the
patent would not have issued."2 08 In Brunswick, Judge Posner held that patent
theft does not satisfy the materiality requirement, which he defined as "but for
the fraud no patent would have been issued to anyone."20 9 Subsequent courts
have cited Brunswick for the proposition that
[flor antitrust purposes, whether a patent could be issued matters more than
who would possess it; if a patent could still "have been issued to someone,"
its market power would still have been concentrated (properly) in one party.
As a result, Walker Process fraud must concern a material issue of patent-
ability; otherwise, a patent would have issued regardless of any fraud, and
potential plaintiffs would have suffered the same monopoly effects (but
legitimately).210
Judge Posner's conception of materiality is overly constrained. The "but for"
materiality means that but for the fraud, the patent would not have issued to this
patent applicant, not that but for the fraud, the patent would not have issued to
anyone. But for a misrepresentation of inventorship, a patent thief would not be
issued a patent. 21' That makes the misrepresentation material because "[t]he
validity of a patent requires that the inventors be correctly named." 212 Much
patent law is based on the assumption that the patent applicant is the true
inventor. For example, "[t]he presumption of the validity of a patent includes a
presumption that the original inventor is named." 2 13 Who invented the patented
207. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
208. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
209. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
210. In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 693 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted) (citing Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265).
211. Patent law requires that the patent application name the actual human inventor even when
the patent issues to a company, such as the inventor's employer. See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2012); Joshua L.
Simmons, Inventions Made for Hire, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & Ewr. L. 1, 3 n.3 (2012) ("[Oinly the
actual inventor is entitled to a patent, and only the inventor or someone he has assigned his patent rights
to in writing may file a patent application, which in either case must be made on the inventor's
behalf.").
212. Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155
F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (collecting cases).
213. Maxwell v. K Mart Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1323, 1331 (D. Minn. 1995).
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product (or process) is material.214 Misrepresenting inventorship in order to
receive a patent that one has not earned constitutes material fraud.
Stealing the intellectual property of a competitor constitutes monopoly con-
duct because it is exclusionary but does not constitute competition on the
merits. Although Judge Posner labels the illegal monopolist's misdeeds as
"skullduggery," 2 15 his terminology is merely a more colorful way of saying "not
competition on the merits." Antitrust cares about competition, including the
competitive process to acquire the patent. Any conduct by a monopolist "that
impairs the opportunities of rivals and either does not further competition on the
merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way may be deemed anticompeti-
,,216tive."6 The theft of someone else's patent is exclusionary conduct as that
phrase is used in Section 2 jurisprudence.
First, the commission of a crime or tort cannot be competition on the merits.
Stealing the intellectual property of another company and misrepresenting it as
your own to the PTO is not competition on the merits because it is illegal.
Patent theft can violate myriad state and federal laws, including breach of
contract, theft of trade secrets and confidential information, unfair competition,
and tortious interference with prospective relations.21 7 In addition to common
law causes of action, some states have statutes that criminalize the theft of trade
secrets,218 as does federal law. In no jurisdiction is misappropriating trade
secrets considered competition on the merits.2 19
Second, in non-intellectual property contexts, antitrust cases hold that steal-
ing a competitor's property does not constitute competition on the merits. For
example, the Sixth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that the United States Tobacco Company engaged in monopoly con-
214. See In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litig., No. MDL NO. 1620, 2006 WL 120343, at *15
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 17, 2006) ("Because it is a critical requirement for obtaining a patent, the issue of
inventorship is highly material in the patent prosecution process."), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 494
F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2007); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2001.06(c) (8th ed. rev. 9, Oct. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP] ("Where the subject matter for which a
patent is being sought is or has been involved in litigation, the existence of such litigation and any other
material information arising therefrom must be brought to the attention of the [PTO]. Examples of such
material information include .. . questions of inventorship . . . ."); see also PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc.
v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (misrepresenting inventorship is
material for inequitable conduct purposes); id. at 1321 (citing MPEP § 2001.06(c), supra, for the
proposition that "inventorship disputes are material information"); Robert A. Armitage, Understanding
the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 108 (2012) (discussing
inventorship after the America Invents Act).
215. Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265.
216. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007).
217. See, e.g., Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1360-66 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding fraudulent
concealment, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract implied in law);
Pension Advisory Grp., Ltd. v. Country Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 680, 697-98 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
218. See, e.g., Pension Advisory Grp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (discussing the Texas Theft Liability
Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134.003(a) (West 2013)).
219. See, e.g., Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1932); see
also HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 79, § 11.5 (discussing the Pick-Barth doctrine).
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duct when it took its competitor's point-of-sale advertising displays and threw
them in the trash. 2 20 The monopolist in that case had essentially stolen its
competitor's property in order to make that competitor less viable. The theft of
intellectual property, as alleged in Brunswick, is even more egregious. Not only
did the monopolist take property away from its competitor, it claimed that
property as its own and used it to stifle competition.
Third, patent theft is a species of deception. Courts have held that the use of
deception to acquire or maintain monopoly power can constitute monopoly
conduct. For example, Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act when it
monopolized the market for operating systems, in part, by deceiving software
application developers that programs written on Microsoft's version of Java
would run on any operating system. 2 2 ' The alleged conduct in the Brunswick
case resembles deception in that the monopolist acquired its competitor's
intellectual property by representing that it would be a trustworthy licensee of
the trade secret and would not seek a patent on an invention that was not theirs.
In sum, stealing is never competition on the merits. It is strange to conclude,
as the Brunswick rule requires, that antitrust law has nothing to say about a
monopolist who acquires its market power through theft instead of competition
on the merits. The nonpatentability element created by the Brunswick opinion
ignores that antitrust liability is a function of how the monopolist acquired (or
maintained) its monopoly power.22 2 Monopolization through patent theft in-
volves conduct that inherently distorts the competitive process. For the competi-
tive process to operate efficiently, it must have integrity-a set of basic rules
that all firms abide by. For example, a firm cannot destroy its rival's factory.
Patent fraud by stealing another's patentable invention harms the competitive
process. If a monopolist acquires its monopoly through theft it is impossible to
escape the conclusion that the monopoly is illegal.
3. Antitrust Injury
In addition to the Grinnell elements, a private plaintiff bringing a Section 2
case must prove that it has suffered antitrust injury. Antitrust injury is "injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful."22 3 Antitrust injury is often considered
as part of a larger discussion of antitrust standing, which courts use as a pruden-
tial matter to determine whether the antitrust plaintiff before them is an appropri-
ate complainant.2 24 Patent fraud in general satisfies the requirements of antitrust
220. See Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 788 (6th Cir. 2002).
221. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
222. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
223. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
224. Courts consider the following factors when analyzing whether a plaintiff has antitrust standing:
"(1) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury; that is, whether it was the type the antitrust laws were
intended to forestall; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the speculative measure of the harm; (4) the
risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in apportioning damages." Amarel v. Connell, 102
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injury and antitrust standing for excluded competitors and consumers.225 Vic-
tims of patent theft should similarly have access to antitrust courts. Both the
true inventor whose patentable idea was stolen and the consumers who pay a
supracompetitive price to the patent thief suffer cognizable antitrust injuries and
should have standing to bring Section 2 claims based on monopolization
through patent theft.
The inventor whose idea was stolen is the most logical plaintiff because its
injury is most direct. Judge Posner acknowledged that "competitors are thought
to be effective (maybe indispensible) surrogates for the many consumers who
do not realize they are the victims of monopolistic practices."2 26 But he argued
that the true inventor does not act as a surrogate in the context of patent theft.
Instead, he asserted that consumers are unaffected by who controls any particu-
lar monopoly-granting patent and thus "a victory for the competitor can confer
,,227no benefit, certain or probable, present or future, on consumers. Judge
Posner concluded that he "cannot find the consumer interest in this case."2 28
Consequently, according to Judge Posner, competitors are not appropriate plain-
tiffs to bring antitrust claims based on patent theft.2 29
Providing antitrust standing to the true inventor can protect the consumer
interest in preserving dynamic competition and the incentives for innovation.
Patent theft can create market power that would not otherwise exist; it can
increase price and reduce efficiency. All of these hurt consumer interests in a
competitive economy. 2 3 0 Patent theft is fundamentally an assault against the
competitive process, which consumers rely on both to reduce short-term price
and increase long-term quality. Just because the Walker Process plaintiff is a
competitor of the illegal monopolist does not change the facts that the patent
thief is in possession of monopoly power that it stole from its rightful owner
and that the inventor-plaintiff suffered a loss caused by the illegal monopolist's
F.3d 1494, 1507 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 (1983)).
225. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(finding that excluded competitor has standing to bring Walker Process claim); TransWeb, LLC v. 3M
Innovative Props. Co., No. 10-4413 (FSH), 2011 WL 2181189, at *20 (D. N.J. June 1, 2011) ("A
foreclosure of competition as a result of the enforcement of an allegedly fraudulently prosecuted patent
would be the type of injury to competition that the antitrust laws are meant to protect." (citing Amgen,
Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d 462, 468 (D. Mass. 2007), for the proposition that
allegations of anticompetitive harm flowing from Walker Process fraud constitutes antitrust injury")).
226. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 267.
229. See id.; see also Columbia River People's Util. Dist. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 217 F.3d 1187,
1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing Brunswick).
230. The concept of antitrust injury is not limited to price increases for consumers. See Blue Shield
of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1982) ("[W]hile an increase in price resulting from a
dampening of competitive market forces is assuredly one type of injury for which § 4 potentially offers
redress, that is not the only form of injury remediable under § 4." (citation omitted)).
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misconduct. 231
Furthermore, in addition to the true inventor, any competitors that the monopo-
list-patent thief excluded from the market have suffered antitrust injury and
should have standing to bring a Section 2 case.2 32 Rivals excluded from the
market by a monopolist's anticompetitive conduct are traditional Section 2
plaintiffs.2 33 They should be, too, in cases of monopolization through patent
theft. Consider the American Cyanamid case in which the pharmaceutical giant
stole and patented a discovery made by two researchers from the University of
Colorado.23 4 American Cyanamid brought at least six infringement suits to
enforce its stolen patents against generic manufacturers in order to exclude them
from the market.2 35 The targets of those lawsuits should be able to bring Walker
Process claims against American Cyanamid in order to recover both their lost
profits and their litigation costs from the prior infringement suits. Recovery is
particularly appropriate because the true inventors had no desire or intent to
exclude firms from utilizing their discovery. But even when the rightful patent
owner would enforce its exclusionary rights, the patent thief has illegally
excluded rivals from the market, and that entitles them to recompense.
The Brunswick opinion also suggests that consumers should not have stand-
ing in cases of patent theft because consumer welfare is unaffected, and thus no
antitrust injury has been suffered. Consumers represent a traditional category of
Section 2 plaintiffs because they suffer antitrust injury whenever they pay a
supracompetitive price to an illegal monopolist. 236 The fact that someone else
might have been able to legally charge them that higher amount does not excuse
the wrong that the theft-based monopolist committed against those consumers.
The illegal monopolist committed a wrong against the consumer even if some-
one else could have done the same thing legally. Furthermore, even if consum-
ers pay the same price regardless of who gets the patent, antitrust law cares
about the competitive process, not only the outcomes for consumers. Antitrust
law seeks to create incentives for proper competitive conduct and to deter
anticompetitive conduct. Just as consumers have standing to bring Walker
231. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 16.3f (4th ed. 2011) (noting that victim
of patent theft by monopolist should have antitrust standing).
232. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the court denied standing to a
defendant in a patent infringement case to argue that the plaintiff had acquired its patent in violation of
the Sherman Act. 114 F3d 1547, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1997), abrogated by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The court reasoned that the alleged infringer had not suffered
antitrust injury because it would have infringed the patent no matter what party rightfully owned it. Id.
But the court did not deal with the contention that not every patentee would similarly enforce the
patent.
233. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding a
competitor-plaintiff victorious in Section 2 litigation against monopolist that used bundled rebates).
234. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 (D. Colo.
2001).
235. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
236. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 521,
555 (2006).
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Process claims based on traditional ordinary patent fraud, they should have
standing to pursue Walker Process claims against patent thieves who illegally
monopolize markets.2 37
Finally, even if antitrust injury were difficult to prove for private plaintiffs,
the federal antitrust agencies do not have to prove antitrust injury to bring a
successful claim.2 38 Even if neither the true inventor nor the affected consumers
were considered appropriate antitrust plaintiffs, the government could bring an
antitrust suit against a patent thief for illegally monopolizing a market through
patent theft. Thus, if Brunswick's allegations are correct, Reigel has acquired
monopoly power to which it is not entitled. It did not acquire the monopoly
power through a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident; in
acquired it by theft. Either the FTC or the DOJ Antitrust Division could pursue
civil litigation against a patent thief for violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
4. No Defense for Patent Theft
After the plaintiff proves a prima facie Section 2 case, the defendant "may
proffer a 'procompetitive justification' for its conduct." 2 3 9 Acquiring or maintain-
ing monopoly power through patent holdings is generally a defense to Section 2
liability.2 4 0 The patent defense to claims of illegal monopolization, however,
requires that the patent be properly enforceable by the patentholder. A fraudu-
lently procured patent does not provide a defense.2 4 1 In the context of monopoli-
zation through patent theft, the general patent defense does not apply because
the defendant is not the legitimate owner of a valid patent. Furthermore,
because patent theft violates the basic rules of the patent system, antitrust
immunity should not attach.24 2
The Brunswick rule makes a critical distinction between fraud that causes the
PTO to issue a patent that should not have been issued to anyone and fraud that
results in the patentee acquiring a patent that should have gone to someone else.
Judge Posner asserts that "[tihe power over price that patent rights confer is
lawful, and is no greater than it otherwise would be just because the person
237. Consumer standing includes state attorneys general who may bring parens patriae suits in the
names of the consumers who reside in their states and who have suffered antitrust injury as a result of
the illegal monopolization. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process
Litigation, 13 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 281, 302 (2007).
238. See In re Canadian Imp. Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2006).
239. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992)).
240. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 305 (1948) ("Within the limits of the
patentee's rights under his patent, monopoly of the process or product by him is authorized by the
patent statutes.").
241. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (D. Colo. 1997) ("Therefore, ownership of a valid
patent precludes antitrust liability for monopolization of a product or process within the scope of the
patent." (citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964))).
242. See Unitherm Food Sys., 375 F.3d at 1356 (noting that antitrust immunity applies to "behavior
conforming to the patent laws").
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exercising the rights is not the one entitled by law to do so." 24 3 But the
defendant's power over price is not lawful if it acquired that power through
theft; it is not the lawful owner of the patent. The fact that someone else could
have monopolized the market legally should not be a defense for the monopolist
that acquired its market power through predatory conduct. The law is filled with
instances where one party may successfully use a defense that another defen-
dant may not. 2 44 Thus, just because the actual inventor could have legally ac-
quired the monopoly without engaging in illegitimate conduct does not mean
that a patent thief's monopoly is lawful despite engaging in illegitimate conduct.
Allowing the traditional patent defense in Section 2 cases involving patent
theft would ignore antitrust law's concern over how a monopolist acquires its
power. The Brunswick rule essentially eliminates the second element of the
Grinnell test that focuses on how the monopolist acquired its monopoly power.
The nonpatentability element holds that so long as the monopoly power can be
held lawfully by one firm, it is lawful under antitrust laws for another firm to
acquire that same monopoly power by any means necessary. In short, the fact
that someone else could legally acquire the patent does not provide a defense to
antitrust liability for the patent thief who monopolizes a market with a stolen
patent. Patent theft is never defensible.2 45
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTITRUST LIABILITY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM
A recurrent issue at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property is
whether the prospect of antitrust liability will undermine the patent system's
ability to stimulate innovation. Antitrust law and intellectual property rights
exist in a delicate balance. While antitrust law condemns exclusionary conduct,
the patent system awards the right to exclude to innovative firms. For those
instances when the patent confers monopoly power, the suspension of competi-
tion is tolerated as the price of encouraging innovation.24 6 Proponents of weak
antitrust enforcement fear that an aggressive approach to patentholders would
weaken the incentive to innovate and to disclose one's innovation in exchange
for exclusionary rights. For example, federal courts have split as to when a
monopolist's refusal to license its intellectual property violates Section 2, with
the Federal Circuit advocating a wide antitrust leeway for patentholders.247
Monopolization through patent theft upsets the balance struck between anti-
243. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984).
244. For example, in many cases, only one specific person may claim a particular tax exemption or
assert a right of self-defense.
245. Cf. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 82, § 15.8b (stating that patent fraud "independently
violates the patent law and other criminal statutes and fails of any credible justification").
246. See Christopher R. Leslie, Patent Tying, Price Discrimination, and Innovation, 77 ANfIfRUST
L.J. 811, 834-35 (2011).
247. Compare Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-20 (9th Cir.
1997) (upholding jury verdict finding monopolist's refusal to license violated Section 2 based on facts),
with In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting claim that
monopolist's refusal to license violated Section 2).
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trust law and awarding exclusionary rights to patentees. Patent theft strikes at
the heart of the patent bargain because the patent thief does not engage in
innovation and therefore has not earned the right to exclude competitors. The
monopolist who has stolen the invention of another firm and misrepresented it
as its own has done nothing to earn protection against antitrust liability. Patent
theft undermines confidence in the patent system because it denies the true
inventor the reward for her invention, which can reduce the incentive to
innovate.24 8 Consequently, the goals of both antitrust law (short-term price
competition) and patent law (long-term incentives to innovate) are thwarted.
Some may argue that patent law, not antitrust law, should address the problem
of patent theft. For example, the Brunswick opinion asserted that "[i]t is not a
purpose of antitrust law to confer patents or to resolve disputes between rival
applicants for a patent."249 It is true that patent law can reassign the patent to
the proper party through an interference proceeding. This is the tack that
Brunswick initially took, waiting a decade in interference limbo before bringing
its antitrust lawsuit against Riegel.
The patent system should certainly try to minimize patent theft, but patent
law alone cannot solve the problem of patent theft because patent law is not
designed to create causes of action against patentholders, even those who
acquire their patents illegally. The patent system gives rights to patentholders,
not against them. In order to properly address patent theft, the legal system
should achieve four related goals: "1) stop on-going misconduct and its effects;
2) disgorge the ill-gotten gains received through the misconduct; 3) deter the
misconduct in the future; and 4) compensate the victims of the misconduct." 25 0
Patent law can accomplish the first goal through a patent interference proceed-
ing that reassigns the patent to its true inventor.
Patent law, however, fails to achieve the three remaining goals. First, patent
law does not disgorge ill-gotten gains. It provides no mechanism to make a
patent thief pay back any monopoly profits or royalties received as a result of
the stolen patent.25 1 Second, patent law cannot deter patent theft because it does
not punish patent theft. Because patent law does not offer a cause of action for
patent theft, it does not provide for damages against patentees who steal the
inventions of others and misrepresent them as their own in order to secure
someone else's patent. Consequently, patent law does not provide a meaningful
disincentive to engage in patent theft. Finally, patent law does not compensate
248. Although Judge Posner argued that Riegel's alleged patent theft is beneficial to consumers
because this means that the alleged thief and true inventor can compete against each other, Brunswick,
752 F.2d at 267, his argument proves too much because such reasoning justifies invalidating the patent
in any antitrust case where patent validity is at issue.
249. Id.
250. Leslie, supra note 163, at 1286.
251. To the extent that patent theft constitutes inequitable conduct, the patent would be rendered
unenforceable. But that would not disgorge any ill-gotten gains collected before the finding of
inequitable conduct.
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the victims of patent theft, either the true inventor or consumers. An interfer-
ence proceeding that eventually awards the patent to its proper owner does not
compensate the true inventor for the time that it was denied its patent rights.
Neither does patent law provide any compensation for consumers who have
paid a monopoly price to the patent thief when the true inventor might have
shared the innovation freely with the world.2 52 Moreover, patent law does not
compensate for the injury to competition, including the reductions in innovation
and efficiency, that patent theft may cause.
In contrast to patent law, an antitrust remedy for patent theft can fulfill the
related goals of disgorgement, deterrence, and compensation. The Sherman Act
provides that the successful antitrust plaintiff is entitled to treble damages and
reasonable attorneys' fees.25 3 The direct victim of the patent theft could sue for
its lost profits, as can competitors who were excluded from the market by the
stolen patent. Consumers could sue the patent thief for the amount that they
were overcharged. All of these damages by any of these plaintiffs are auto-
matically tripled. The amount of damages awarded to the successful antitrust
plaintiff would thus be sufficiently high to disgorge the ill-gotten gains of the
illegal monopolist.
Antitrust liability for monopolization through patent theft also better opti-
mizes deterrence. An interference proceeding does not create a sufficient de-
terrent against the initial theft, which can still be net beneficial if the thief
receives monopoly profits in the short run and can be wildly beneficial if it can
somehow get away with it.2 5 4 In contrast to the remedial approach of the patent
system, the treble damages awarded to a successful Section 2 plaintiff provide a
meaningful deterrent against stealing patentable products in the first place. By
helping to deter patent theft, antitrust liability can help the patent system operate
more efficiently.
Furthermore, these sums should compensate all of the various categories of
patent theft victims for their losses. Achieving this set of goals is important
because it helps restore the incentive structure underlying the patent system.
After all, without an antitrust claim for patent theft that actually compensates
them for any losses, innovators may have less incentive to invest in research or
to license their trade secrets.
Other non-patent areas of law are similarly constrained in their ability to
address the problem of patent theft. For example, some instances of patent
theft may violate trade secret law, which punishes misappropriations of trade
secrets. But trade secret law may not deter patent theft as effectively as antitrust
liability because trade secret law does not provide for automatic treble damages
252. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243-46 (D.
Colo. 2001).
253. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
254. Even with an antitrust remedy, there is still a chance of the patent thief profiting from
misconduct, but there is now also a powerful potential cost in the form of treble damages, which can
make the expected value of the theft net negative.
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and recovery of attorneys' fees.25 5 Moreover, patent theft is worse than mere
misappropriation of a trade secret because the thief does not simply steal a trade
secret, but also obtains a patent that would prevent the innovator from exploit-
ing her own invention. Trade secret law does not provide recovery for excluded
competitors or overcharged consumers in cases where the patent thief behaves
more aggressively than the true inventor would have. Finally, trade secret law
provides no remedy when the patent theft does not involve misappropriation of
a trade secret, as in the FilmTec case.2 56
Patent theft may constitute a breach of contract as when (as alleged in
Brunswick) a licensee purloins the licensor's technology and patents it in vio-
lation of the licensing agreement. Contract law remedies are insufficient to deter
patent theft because they provide merely for expectation damages, not treble
damages or attorneys' fees. Contract law does not provide a remedy for con-
sumer injuries associated with patent theft.2 57 Finally, not all patent theft will
necessarily constitute a breach of contract. For example, if a rival were to break
into an innovator's facilities in order steal an idea and apply for a patent, the
applicant has committed patent theft but not breach of contract. Antitrust
liability can provide a recovery in situations where contract law does not.
The law of unjust enrichment can achieve some of the goals that cannot be
attained through either contract or intellectual property law. Patent theft can
give rise to a claim for unjust enrichment.25 8 In such cases, courts have
approved disgorgement of a patent thief's ill-gotten gains as an appropriate
remedy.259 Disgorgement, however, may be necessary but not sufficient to deter
patent theft because so long as liability is uncertain, patent theft has a positive
expected value. In contrast, because antitrust law awards treble damages, anti-
trust violations can have a negative expected value even though detection and
enforcement are less than perfect.
These non-antitrust causes of action for patent theft hold one major advantage
over an antitrust solution. Section 2 liability requires the plaintiff to prove that
the patent thief is a monopolist or enjoys a dangerous probability of acquiring
monopoly power through patent theft. The trade secret and contract causes of
action have no market power requirement. Patent theft may violate these areas
of law regardless of the defendant's monopoly status. This suggests that all of
these areas of law-antitrust, trade secret, and contract-should play a role in
deterring patent theft and compensating victims. Antitrust law should not
supplant other legal remedies for patent theft. The potential for trade secret and
255. Trade secret law may allow for exemplary damages for "willful and malicious misappropria-
tion." See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(c) (West 2014).
256. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
257. A third-party beneficiary theory of recovery may be possible, but most courts would probably
find this to be too tenuous.
258. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
259. See id. at 1311.
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contract remedies, however, does not displace the need for antitrust liability
when patent theft results in illegal monopolization.
Antitrust liability for patent theft restores the balance between antitrust law
and the patent system. The patent system cares about patent applicants honestly
representing inventorship. The antitrust regime cares about firms acquiring
monopoly power through anticompetitive conduct. When patent theft results in
a monopoly, the patent thief is violating both antitrust law and patent law by
misrepresenting inventorship in order to secure a patent that rightfully belongs
to someone else. Permitting antitrust liability for monopolization through patent
theft does not invite antitrust law to meddle improperly in the patent system.
Patent law still determines the standards for patentability. Antitrust law becomes
relevant only after the applicant has already violated the rules of the patent
system. Recognizing that Walker Process liability includes monopolization
through patent theft does not constitute an improper antitrust intrusion onto
patent law's turf.
CONCLUSION
The Brunswick rule that Walker Process liability does not attach if the
underlying invention is patentable creates a fundamental distinction between
patent fraud and patent theft, in which the latter is exempt from antitrust
liability. The premises of the Brunswick rule, however, are flawed. Most nota-
bly, under certain market conditions, patent theft can lead to monopoly power
and higher prices than would otherwise prevail. Furthermore, it can distort
innovation and generate inefficiencies, including patent suppression and subopti-
mal licensing practices.
Most instances of patent theft will probably not violate antitrust law-just as
most acts of fraud before the Patent Office do not create antitrust liability-
because the misdeed often does not create monopoly power. But probability
does not mean impossibility. Patent theft can create monopoly power and distort
markets. When a monopolist employs patent theft to acquire or maintain a
monopoly, it violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
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